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Abstract 
Industry expertise is an important aspect of sell-side research. We explore this aspect 
using a novel dataset of industry recommendations, which are often issued by strategy 
analysts. We study sell-side analysts’ ability to rank industries relative to each other 
(across-industry expertise), and how it relates to analysts’ ability to rank firms in a 
particular industry (within-industry expertise). We find that analysts express more 
optimism towards industries with higher levels of investment, past profitability, and past 
returns. Analysts exhibit across-industry expertise, as portfolios based on industry 
recommendations generate abnormal returns over both short and long horizons, beyond 
what would be explained by industry momentum. Additionally, industry 
recommendations contain information, which is orthogonal to the information revealed in 
firm recommendations, and more so for brokers who benchmark their firm 
recommendations to industry peers. Consequently, the investment value of sell-side 
analysts’ recommendations is enhanced when both dimensions of industry expertise are 
utilized by considering industry and firm recommendations in combination.  
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1 Introduction 
Industry knowledge in sell-side research is highly valued by investors. For example, 
Institutional Investor Magazine has been surveying institutional investors on the importance of 
various attributes in sell-side research analysts. For each year in the period 1998-2010 industry 
knowledge was deemed the most important research attribute of equity analysts. 1  Indeed, 
industry analysis is an important component of the sell-side research business. First, strategy 
analysts in brokerage houses (strategists for short) often issue industry-level forecasts and 
recommendations in their periodic reports. These analysts typically follow a top-down approach, 
trying to exploit sector-rotation strategies mostly driven by the cyclicality of different industries 
and their sensitivities to macroeconomic shocks. Second, firm-level analysts, who constitute the 
vast majority of the sell-side research personnel, specialize by industry. At the firm level, they 
analyze specific firms in their assigned industry, providing earnings estimates, recommendations, 
price targets, etc. At the industry level, they write periodic industry reports, mostly from a 
bottom-up perspective, and often incorporate into their reports the industry recommendation 
advice from the strategists. The extant literature has explored analysts’ firm recommendations 
extensively.2 Despite the importance of industry expertise in sell-side research, this topic has not 
yet been fully investigated, probably due to the lack of large scale data on industry 
recommendations.  
Industry expertise can take two forms. The first is within-industry expertise, which 
reflects the analyst’s knowledge of economic factors affecting the performance of firms in the 
industry, and the analyst’s ability to value and rank firms in the industry. The second form is 
across-industry expertise, which reflects the ability to compare the prospects of the industry to 
the market and to other industries. Explicit industry recommendations should reflect across-
industry expertise. By contrast, firm recommendations can reflect both within- and across-
industry expertise. Boni and Womack (2006) focus mostly on analysts’ within-industry expertise 
as reflected in firm recommendations. In this paper we study whether sell-side analysts possess 
                                                 
1  See http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Research/961/What-Investors-Really-Want.html for the most recent 
edition (2010) of the ranking of the research attributes valued by investors. 
2 For a recent review of the literature see Ramnath et al. (2008). 
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across-industry expertise as reflected in their industry recommendations, and how the within- 
and across-industry expertise interact.3 
To motivate the analysis, consider the following example. During the second half of 
2007, the median firm recommendation issued for both GM and Chevron was a ‘hold.’ However, 
at that time, analysts issued bearish recommendations for the Automobiles industry as a whole, 
while they typically issued bullish recommendations for the Oil industry. This scenario raises 
several interesting questions.  
First, what are the industry attributes that determine the level of industry 
recommendations? In the example above, did strategists favor the energy industry because it had 
shown high past returns, high profitability, or perhaps high equity issuance volume? Second, do 
analysts have across-industry expertise as reflected in their industry recommendations? In 
particular, do recommendations for industries carry any value to investors?  Third, to the extent 
that industry recommendations do reflect across-industry insights, is this information incremental 
to that already included in firm recommendations? Indeed, firm recommendations can include 
information about the ranking of firms within an industry, and about the performance of firms (or 
the industry to which they belong) relative to the market as a whole. Thus, it is possible that 
industry recommendations are subsumed by firm recommendations or their aggregations. 
Finally, a closely related question is whether firm-level analysts benchmark their firm 
recommendations to the market or to industry peers. In the example above, it is interesting to 
understand whether the ‘hold’ recommendations assigned to GM and Chevron have the same 
meaning or whether they should take into account the different industry recommendations. In 
this sense we ought to understand whether the “hold” recommendation issued for GM was 
relative to the entire market or, instead, relative to peers such as Ford, Chrysler, and Toyota. 
To answer these questions we use the IBES database to collect industry 
recommendations. When an analyst produces a report with a recommendation on a firm’s stock, 
she often includes in the report the brokerage house’s current outlook on that firm’s industry. In 
September 2002, IBES started recording the textual information on the industry outlook for those 
brokers reporting the industry recommendation in their firm reports. We identify 33 financial 
institutions for which textual information on industry outlooks is available. Our sample includes 
                                                 
3 Throughout the paper, the terms “sell-side analysts,” or simply “analysts,” refer to both firm-level and strategy 
analysts. Occasionally, when the distinction is important we refer to each type of analyst specifically. 
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a total of 41,315 industry recommendations in the period from September 2002 through 
December 2009. Overall, 32% of the industry recommendations are optimistic, 54% are neutral, 
and 14% are pessimistic. We study the factors associated with the level of optimism in industry 
recommendations. We find that past profitability, past returns, and the extent of R&D and Capex 
activity are positively associated with the probability of issuing an optimistic industry 
recommendation. We also find that analysts indeed exploit sector rotation strategies as they are 
less optimistic toward cyclical industries during recessions.  
We next turn to examine the across-industry expertise of analysts as reflected in industry 
recommendations. These industry recommendations are for the most part determined by 
strategists using a macroeconomic point of view. Strategists also rely on the input and 
knowledge of firm-level analysts, who can aggregate information from their analysis of 
individual firms. It is thus possible that industry recommendations can identify “hot” and “cold” 
industries, reflecting the joint knowledge of strategists and firm-level analysts. On the other 
hand, several reasons conspire to make it difficult for investors to exploit analysts’ across-
industry expertise. One of the reasons relates to analysts’ role in collecting and using 
information. The literature has covered extensively how firm-level analysts’ special access to 
management affects the way they perform.4 These attributes are likely to augment analysts’ 
within-industry expertise. However, it is not clear whether analogous attributes can be developed 
with respect to the analysis of macroeconomic data, which is key in generating industry 
recommendations. Another issue that may limit our ability to find evidence of across-industry 
expertise is that industry recommendations are likely to be quite stale when they become 
available on IBES. The industry recommendations that we observe are recorded only when a 
new firm recommendation is issued, so we cannot identify the exact date in which the industry 
recommendation was originally issued.  
Our approach to testing for the presence of industry expertise is to examine whether 
investors can obtain abnormal returns by following these recommendations. Specifically, we 
compute abnormal returns (measured as Fama-French four-factor alphas) of industry portfolios 
formed based on changes (upgrades/downgrades) in monthly average industry recommendations. 
                                                 
4 For example, the presence of an underwriting relationship enables a broker to issue better earnings forecasts 
(Malloy, 2005) or to be a better market maker (Ellis et al., 2000; Madureira and Underwood, 2008), while the 
presence of a lending relationship affects the ability of a broker to secure future underwriting business (Drucker and 
Puri, 2005; Ljungqvist et al., 2006), get better terms for new security offerings (Puri, 1996), or provide better 
earnings forecasts (Ergungor et al., 2009). 
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We find that a portfolio of industries about which analysts are most optimistic carries a 
significant abnormal return of 0.6% per month, while a pessimistic portfolio carries a 
significantly negative abnormal return of 0.9% per month. These results suggest the presence of 
across-industry expertise reflected in both optimistic and pessimistic industry recommendations. 
The abnormal returns are strongest for short horizons of one month. Their magnitudes and 
statistical significance diminish over longer horizons of up to 12 months, but we do not observe a 
complete reversal. Additionally, the results do not appear to be driven by an “up” or “down” 
market, and are not reversed during the bear market of 2008. 
Next we turn to studying the interaction between across- and within-industry expertise of 
analysts. In particular, we attempt to find whether the across-industry expertise of analysts is 
already reflected in firm recommendations, or in their aggregations. To this end, it is important to 
identify whether firm recommendations contain information regarding industry outlooks, or 
whether firm recommendations just rank firms within industries. Our first step is to examine 
brokers’ disclosures about how their firm recommendations should be interpreted. By examining 
these disclosures for the 20 largest brokers, we find that 10 of these brokers, including six in our 
industry recommendation sample, benchmark their firm recommendations to industry peers, 
while the other 10 rely on a market benchmark.  
Different benchmarks imply different ways by which firm recommendations reflect 
industry information. If brokers use an industry benchmark, then their firm recommendations 
will contain no industry-wide information. Essentially such brokers limit their firm 
recommendations to ranking firms within industries, and only their within-industry expertise gets 
reflected in the recommendations. By contrast, if brokers use a market benchmark, then their 
firm recommendations are expected to incorporate industry outlooks and to reflect both within-
industry and across-industry expertise. To help us distinguish between these alternatives we 
construct “pseudo industry recommendations” – similar to those used in Boni and Womack 
(2006) – by value weighting all firm recommendations that belong to a specific GICS industry. 
Interestingly, we find that the correlation between the pseudo industry recommendations and the 
true industry recommendations is low (around 0.10-0.15), suggesting that the two are based on 
different information. We then repeat the abnormal return analysis using the pseudo industry 
recommendations. As expected, we find some evidence of abnormal returns for brokers who 
benchmark their firm recommendation to the market. By contrast, pseudo industry 
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recommendations by brokers who benchmark their firm recommendations to industry peers 
generate no abnormal returns. Hence, at least for analysts who benchmark firm recommendations 
to industry peers, it appears that true industry recommendations contain information regarding 
industry outlooks which is not already reflected in firm recommendations or in aggregations 
thereof.  
Prior research demonstrates that firm recommendations carry investment value [e.g., 
Stickel (1995); Womack (1996); Barber et al. (2001, 2006, 2010); Jegadeesh et al. (2004)]. If 
indeed firm recommendations are often aimed at ranking firms within industries, then adding the 
across-industry information by conditioning firm recommendations on the prospects of the 
relevant industry should increase their investment value. Our next set of tests pursues this line of 
thought by combining both analysts’ across- and within-industry expertise in forming investment 
portfolios. At the industry level, we classify industries into three portfolios based on true industry 
recommendations as before. At the firm level, we follow Boni and Womack (2006) and classify 
firms into net upgraded and net downgraded firms. A firm can be allocated to one of six 
portfolios depending on its own recommendation (upgraded/downgraded) and on whether its 
industry carries an optimistic, neutral or pessimistic prospect.  
The results support the idea that across- and within-industry expertise complement each 
other. Indeed, combining industry and firm recommendations adds investment value over 
investment horizons of up to 12 months. For example, when considering a short investment 
horizon of one month, net upgraded stocks have abnormal returns only if they are part of 
industries with an optimistic or neutral outlook, but not when they are part of industries with 
pessimistic outlooks. In a similar fashion, net downgraded stocks have significantly negative 
alphas only when they belong to industries downgraded to a pessimistic outlook. In fact, when a 
downgraded firm belongs to an upgraded industry, it generates a positive abnormal return. 
Finally, we find that portfolios that are based on the combined signal of both industry and firm 
recommendations outperform portfolios based on just one of the two signals.  
The results so far are consistent with analysts possessing across-industry expertise. 
However, two other explanations also seem plausible. First, it is possible that analysts do not 
possess any across-industry expertise. Instead, analysts chase industry momentum, and the 
abnormal returns we document are a reflection of this well-documented phenomenon 
[Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)]. We conduct multiple tests to explore this possibility. For 
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instance, we consider portfolios based on industry recommendations after excluding industries 
that also exhibit momentum. The results show that industry recommendations have investment 
value regardless of past returns, supporting the idea that they reflect across-industry expertise. 
Second, it may be that analysts do not possess insights regarding the long-term 
fundamentals of the industry. Rather, industry recommendations generate a “hype” or sentiment 
for some industries that leads to temporary price pressure and to the abnormal returns we 
observe. If that is the case, then the returns following industry recommendations should be short 
lived, as prices revert to fundamentals in the long-run. We thus examine whether the short-term 
abnormal returns obtained from following industry recommendations are reversed within one 
year. While the medium- to long-term returns (over horizons of up to 12 months) to following 
industry recommendations are lower than the corresponding one-month returns, they are often 
still significant. Moreover, a direct test does not show evidence of reversals. We conclude that to 
the extent that a reversal in returns exists, it is only partial. This is again consistent with analysts 
possessing across-industry expertise. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. To our knowledge, this is the first 
paper to analyze the outputs of strategy analysts in the form of industry recommendations. We 
also highlight the two dimensions of industry expertise (across-industry and within-industry) that 
could potentially be reflected in sell-side analysts’ recommendations. Boni and Womack (2006) 
were the first to analyze the within-industry dimension. They show that the value of firm 
recommendations comes mostly from ranking firms within industries. Boni and Womack (2006) 
did not have access to industry recommendations, and instead analyzed aggregations of firm 
recommendations to assess across-industry expertise. They conclude that such aggregations 
cannot be used as signals for industry prospects. We extend the literature by directly testing for 
analysts’ across-industry expertise using industry recommendation data. Our results suggest that 
analysts do possess across-industry expertise, and show the relevance of industry 
recommendations from an investment perspective. It is worth emphasizing that our study and 
Boni and Womack (2006) are not directly comparable since the sample periods are different. 
While Boni and Womack (2006) use data from 1996-2002, our data starts in September 2002. 
Second, the paper also sheds new light on the information contained in firm 
recommendations. Different brokers define their firm recommendations based on different 
benchmarks – either the market or the peers in the industry. We establish that industry 
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recommendations contain information that is reflecting analysts’ across-industry expertise and 
that is orthogonal to the information included in firm recommendations, which mostly reflects 
within-industry expertise. In fact, firm recommendations are best interpreted in conjunction with 
industry recommendations, jointly exploiting both dimensions of expertise. 
Finally, we revisit the unsettled issue of whether aggregations of firm recommendations 
at the industry level can serve as proxies for industry outlook. While Boni and Womack (2006) 
conclude that such aggregations are not good proxies for the industry prospects, Howe et al. 
(2009) find modest evidence that they can forecast industry returns. We point out that industry 
aggregations of firm recommendations should reflect across-industry expertise conditional on the 
recommendation benchmark adopted by the broker. Accordingly, we show that aggregations of 
firm recommendations contain some information about the industry’s prospects when issued by 
analysts using a market benchmark, but not when issued by analysts using the industry peers as a 
benchmark.  
Thus, the paper highlights the role of analysts as producers of, or at least conduits for, 
information at the industry level. Piotroski and Roulstone’s (2004) results using stock non-
synchronicity measures imply that analyst activity – proxied by the number of analysts issuing 
forecasts for a firm – helps in incorporating industry information into market prices. Our study 
provides direct evidence for the presence of analysts’ industry expertise. In particular, we study 
the previously unexplored across-industry dimension of analysts’ expertise, and how it gets 
reflected in firm and industry recommendations.5  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data and in 
Section 3 we explore the determinants of industry recommendations. In Section 4 we study the 
across-industry expertise in sell-side research. Section 5 discusses the relation between across-
industry and within-industry expertise. Section 6 explores two alternative explanations for the 
results. Section 7 concludes.  
                                                 
5Our paper also relates to the literature exploring the relative importance of industry selection in the investment 
process. See, for example, Froot and Teo (2008), Busse and Tong (2008), Kacperczyk et al. (2005), and Avramov 
and Wermers (2006). Our results add to this literature by directly showing that industry specialists are capable of 
providing useful industry outlooks. 
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2 Data 
2.1 Firm Analysts vs. Strategists6 
The bulk of the data employed in sell-side research studies concerns firm-level analysts. 
These analysts specialize by industry and produce earnings forecasts, price targets and firm 
recommendations. The production and dissemination of industry recommendations often involve 
the participation of a different type of sell-side analyst: the one working in the equity strategy 
group (strategist) of the brokerage house. Contrary to the traditional (firm-level) analysts, 
strategists are not linked to specific firms or industries, but rather focus on the equity market as a 
whole.  
When strategists issue industry recommendations, they mostly rely on a top-down 
approach in which they analyze macroeconomic conditions. A common method for these 
strategists is to exploit “sector rotation” in which they follow business cycles and base industry 
recommendations on their estimates of the exposure of each industry to macroeconomic shocks. 
Strategists also often use as inputs information from firm-level analysts, who rely on a bottom-up 
approach.  Thus, industry recommendations are determined for the most part by strategists with 
the level of involvement of firm-level analysts varying from broker to broker. In some situations, 
e.g., when advice from strategists is not available, firm-level analysts can issue industry 
recommendations. Several brokers include their industry recommendations in periodic economic 
outlook reports published by the strategy department of the brokerage house. These 
recommendations are also often incorporated into firm and industry reports that are produced by 
firm-level analysts. In particular, the data we use consist of industry recommendations that are 
attached to firm reports.7,8 
The importance of the activities of strategy analysts is highlighted by the All-America 
Research Team (the “all-star”) rankings from Institutional Investor (II) Magazine. Besides the 
traditional prizes for best analysts in each industry, II Magazine also grants awards for analysts 
                                                 
6 We thank the reviewer for drawing our attention to the role of strategy analysts in the issuance of industry 
recommendations. 
7 The information in this paragraph is based on interviews we conducted with current and former analysts (including 
strategists) from various brokerage houses including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, 
Robert Baird, Barclays (formerly Lehman Brothers), CSFB, UBS, Bear Stearns, and Sanford Bernstein. 
8 Strategists can also produce more aggregated data such as top-down earnings forecasts for the S&P 500 and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average. See Darrough and Russell (2002). 
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under coarser categories such as Portfolio Strategy and Quantitative Research. These awards are 
sometimes given based on industry recommendations.9  
2.2 Brokers and Industry Recommendations 
Starting in September of 2002 IBES began to record industry recommendations alongside 
firm recommendations.10 This information is recorded in the ‘btext’ (more lately ‘etext’) field in 
the IBES recommendation file. This field always contains the text of the firm recommendation 
(e.g. ‘buy’, ‘hold’, ‘underperform’). For investment banks that include an industry 
recommendation in their firm reports, the field also records the industry recommendations. See 
Appendix I for details. 
In the period starting in September 2002 through December 2009, 33 brokers have 
provided at least one industry recommendation.11 Panel A of Table 1 lists those brokers along 
with some information regarding their coverage. As listed, the six largest brokers in our sample 
in terms of the number of industry recommendations made available on IBES are Goldman 
Sachs, CSFB, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers (replaced by Barclays in 2008) 
and CIBC. For these brokers, we find that industry recommendations are attached to firm 
recommendations over 95% of the time.  
Two points should be noted. First, other large investment banks also issue industry 
recommendations. However, these banks do not include their industry recommendations in firm 
reports, and hence their industry recommendations are not recorded by IBES. In general, 16.6% 
of all firm recommendations in IBES during our sample period carry with them an industry 
recommendation. Second, 96% of all industry recommendations in our sample are issued by the 
seven largest brokers. Therefore, our conclusions mostly apply to the largest, full-service 
brokers.  
                                                 
9 The qualitative descriptions of the analysts earning the all-star designations, both for the best analyst in each sector 
and for the best strategist, often draw attention to their correct calls on industry outlooks. For example, the II 
Magazine once emphasized how a first-prize industry analyst “had been urging clients to underweight their holdings 
in his sector” (2010 edition, page 47), while for the first-prize in the Portfolio Strategy category the II Magazine 
praised the strategist’s call to “dump defensive stocks such as telecommunications and health care companies and 
load up on consumer discretionary stocks” (2009 edition, page 98) or how the strategist “reiterated his overweight 
stance” in a specific sector (2008 edition, page 98) that later outperformed the market. 
10 Note that IBES files starting from 2009 do not include recommendations from Lehman Brothers (before they were 
converted to Barclays). We obtain these recommendations from the 2008 files. 
11 In line with Kadan et al. (2009) we omit from the sample recommendations re-issued during the change in rating 
systems during 2002. Similarly, we omit recommendations originally issued by Lehman Brothers, and then re-issued 
by Barclays when taking over Lehman’s research department during 2008. That is, we only account for these 
recommendations once, when they were initially issued. 
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<Insert Table 1 here> 
2.3 Industry Classification 
IBES reports the industry recommendation issued by a broker for the industry to which a 
firm belongs. However, IBES does not explicitly report the industry to which the firm belongs, 
as defined by the broker. We infer this industry from the identity of the firm and its industry 
classification as defined by the General Industry Classification Standard (GICS) obtained from 
Compustat. This classification is maintained by Standard & Poor’s and MSCI Barra, and is 
widely adopted by investment banks as an industry classification system (as opposed to the SIC 
classification that is popular among academics). The GICS system has four classification levels: 
10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries, and 154 sub-industries. These classifications are 
highly intuitive, and have been shown to better explain stock comovements compared to other 
popular industry classifications (Bhojraj et al., 2003). In the context of this research, Boni and 
Womack (2006) show that the GICS classification is a good proxy for how sell-side analysts 
specialize by industry.12 Similar to Boni and Womack (2006) and Bhojraj et al. (2003), we focus 
on the industry level (6 digits). Appendix II presents the complete list of industries using the 
GICS classification, as well as some basic statistics of industry coverage by the brokers in our 
sample.13  
According to Boni and Womack (2006), the percentage of all companies an analyst 
covers that are in one GICS industry averages 81% for analysts at the 20 largest brokerages. For 
our sample of brokers with industry recommendations, the statistic for the period 2002-2009 is 
78%. This suggests that by relying on the GICS classification we are misclassifying industries 
relative to the true classification used by the broker about 22% of the time.14 Note that such 
                                                 
12 We extend the analysis offered in Boni and Womack (2006), by comparing the analyst coverage choice in our 
sample relative to different industry classifications: besides GICS, we also look at SIC (2 digits), IBES internal 
classification and the Fama-French 48 industries. The comparison (available upon request) shows that the GICS 
partition most closely resembles how brokers define their industries. 
13 Standard and Poors and MSCI Barra change their GICS industry definitions from time to time, and some GICS 
industries have been discontinued during our sample period. This is the reason why Panel A of Table 1 shows 70 
industries with industry recommendations for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, while the number of GICS 
industries as of August 2008  (the last time during our sample period when changes in the GICS were made) is only 
68. 
14 In fact, these numbers serve as an upper bound on the error, since in many cases analysts still use the GICS 
classification method, but occasionally focus on the industry-group or sector level, rather than the industry level. For 
example, an analyst can cover all firms in the ‘Utilities’ industry, while the GICS industry level distinguishes 
between ‘Gas’ and ‘Electric Utilities’. Our method of constructing portfolios (see Section 4.1) is robust to such 
cases.  Real errors can occur only when broker uses a classification system that is different from GICS.  
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misclassifications work against finding any evidence of return predictability based on industry 
recommendations. In Section 4.1 we construct industry consensus recommendations in a way 
that mitigates some of the errors due to these inevitable misclassifications.  
2.4 Industry Recommendations 
Similar to firm recommendations, brokerage houses use a variety of terms to express 
optimism, neutrality, or pessimism toward industries. In the case of firm recommendations, IBES 
transforms the textual recommendation into a five-point rating system (recorded in the IRECCD 
item). By contrast, the text of industry recommendation is not recorded numerically. Hence, we 
convert the text using a key presented in Appendix I. We code recommendations with an 
optimistic tone as ‘1’, recommendations with a neutral tone as ‘2’, and recommendations with a 
pessimistic tone as ‘3’. Thus, for each IBES entry that also includes the textual description of the 
industry outlook, we have both the recommendation for the firm itself (optimistic, neutral, or 
pessimistic) and the recommendation for the industry to which the firm belongs (again, 
optimistic, neutral, or pessimistic).  
3 Basic Characteristics of Industry Recommendations 
Panels B through D of Table 1 present summary statistics to describe coverage and 
distributional properties of industry recommendations for the largest six brokers in our sample. 
Panel B shows that coverage is quite comprehensive across the universe of industries for five out 
of the six brokers during 2002-2009.15 This suggests that in contrast to firm recommendations, 
selection bias (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997) is not a major issue with industry 
recommendations for large brokers, though it may still be an issue for small brokers that focus on 
select industries. 
Panel C presents the distribution of industry recommendations by year for all brokers in 
our sample. The table shows that the frequency of optimistic recommendations hovers around 
30%, with little variation over the years. There is, however, a modest increase in the frequency of 
neutral recommendations accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of pessimistic 
recommendations. Panel D presents the average industry recommendations by broker for the six 
                                                 
15 The table actually includes seven brokers. Lehman Brothers was replaced during 2008 by Barclays. Also, IBES 
does not have any industry recommendation from Bear Stearns and CSFB in 2009. During the year 2002 coverage is 
lower because our sample period only starts in September of that year. In 2008 we see a decline in industry coverage 
of CIBC and CSFB. 
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largest brokers during our sample period. The results show that there is little difference between 
the different brokers, as average recommendations hover somewhat below ‘2’ (neutral to slightly 
optimistic) for all of them. These results suggest that brokers issue a pretty balanced distribution 
of industry recommendations, with just a small inclination toward optimism. In Section  5 we 
compare this distribution to that of the associated firm recommendations.  
To better understand the determinants of industry recommendations we examine the 
probability of issuing an optimistic/pessimistic industry recommendation as a function of several 
factors. The main explanatory variables we investigate are industry size (aggregate market-value 
of all firms in the industry in the month before the recommendation), lagged industry and market 
returns, and industry value-weighted averages of market-to-book ratio, profitability (return on 
assets), R&D (as a fraction of assets), and capital expenditures (as a fraction of assets). All 
accounting variables are measured during the year prior to the issuance of the industry 
recommendation.  
Given that industry recommendations are often issued by strategists allegedly rotating 
among industries in reaction to macroeconomic shocks, we include in the model a dummy for the 
NBER recessions. During our sample period there were two expansions and one recession (from 
December 2007 to June 2009). We also include another dummy classifying an industry as either 
cyclical or non-cyclical depending on its sensitivity to the business cycle. Our classification 
follows Barra (2009), and identifies as cyclical the industries belonging to the Materials, 
Industrials, and Information Technology sectors (GICS sectors 15, 20, and 45). We then consider 
the interaction between these two variables to test for sector rotation in the issuance of industry 
recommendations.  
Underwriting activity is largely firm-specific. Thus, unlike in firm recommendations, one 
may not expect conflicts of interests associated with underwriting to affect industry 
recommendations. Nevertheless, to control for the possibility that analysts are more optimistic 
about industries that have a high IPO/SEO activity we include three variables related to equity 
underwriting activity.  The first two are the total and average IPO/SEO proceeds in the industry 
during the year preceding the recommendation. These variables capture the volume of equity 
issuance in the industry. The last variable is the percentage of IPO/SEO proceeds in an industry 
underwritten by the issuing broker during the two years preceding the recommendation, out of all 
IPO/SEO proceeds underwritten by this broker during that time period. This variable is close in 
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spirit to the “affiliation” variable used in prior research to proxy for conflicts of interest at the 
firm level [Lin and McNichols (1998); Michaely and Womack (1999)]. We control for broker 
fixed effects to account for any broker-specific time invariant characteristics. We cluster the 
standard errors at the broker-industry level.  
Table 2 presents the results of logit models based on the explanatory variables above. For 
this analysis we drop reiterations, i.e. observations with the same industry recommendations 
from a particular broker in each month. Thus, we only keep one observation per industry-month 
from any given broker except in cases in which the industry recommendation changed during the 
month. We use two specifications. In the first (second) specification the dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to one when the industry recommendation is optimistic (pessimistic) and zero 
otherwise.16 Consider the first specification. The probability of issuing an optimistic industry 
recommendation is increasing in the average profitability, R&D, and Capex intensity in the 
industry, and decreasing in the market-to-book ratio. For example, for the median industry, a one 
standard deviation increase in R&D intensity increases the probability of issuing an optimistic 
industry recommendation by 4.1 percentage points.17  We also observe a momentum effect as the 
probability of issuing an optimistic industry recommendation is increasing in the industry returns 
during the two quarters preceding the recommendation.  
Analysts tend to favor cyclical industries during booms as reflected in the positive 
coefficient on the cyclical dummy. However, cyclical industries fall out of favor during 
recessions as reflected in the interaction term between the cyclical and recession dummies, in 
line with a sector rotation approach.  Finally, we observe some mixed evidence on the tendency 
of brokers to issue an optimistic recommendation to industries in which there is more 
underwriting activity as the coefficient on the total volume of IPOs/SEOs in the industry is 
positive, while the coefficient on the average offering size is negative.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
                                                 
16 Note that the two specifications are not mutually independent. They reflect the same set of results viewed from 
two different angles. It would have been desirable to pool the two separate logistic models into a single ordered-logit 
model. However, this is not possible, since the Wald test rejects the parallel regression assumption, implying that an 
ordered-logit (and similarly an ordered-probit) is not valid in this case. See Long and Freese (2006: p. 197-200) for 
details. 
17 For the median firm, the marginal effect of R&D (from Table 2) is 0.96, and the standard deviation of R&D is 
0.0433 (not tabulated).  
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Similar to the optimistic model, the pessimistic model shows that high R&D and Capex 
activities are less likely to be associated with a pessimistic industry recommendation. Like the 
optimistic model, we observe a strong momentum effect. There are also hints of the sector 
rotation strategy playing a role here: analysts are less likely to issue a pessimistic 
recommendation to cyclical industries during booms (that is, when the cyclical dummy is 1 and 
the recession dummy is 0) and to non-cyclical industries during recessions (when the cyclical 
dummy is 0 and the recession dummy is 1). Finally, underwriting activity does not seem to affect 
the probability of issuing a pessimistic industry recommendation.18  
4 Analysts’ Across-Industry Expertise 
There is an extensive literature showing that firm-level analysts add value with their firm 
recommendations and possess within-industry expertise. 19  A natural question that arises is 
whether analysts (firm-level or strategists) have across-industry expertise that allows them to 
make informative predictions regarding the prospects of industries rather than firms.  
Industry analysis in sell-side research is implemented by a combination of the work of 
analysts in the strategy group and the traditional firm-level analysts. The two types of analysts 
complement each other. Jointly, they have access to a synthesis of top-down macroeconomic 
data and bottom-up aggregated firm-specific knowledge, putting them in a good position to 
identify “hot” and “cold” industries. On the other hand, some prominent features of industry 
recommendations make their investment value less obvious. Generating such recommendations 
requires skill and experience, but they are largely based on widely available macroeconomic 
data, diminishing any informational advantage. 
The analysis in this section explores whether analysts have across-industry expertise by 
analyzing the returns of portfolios constructed based on industry recommendations. That is, we 
ask whether an investor would have obtained abnormal returns, had she followed up on the 
recommendations by investing in these portfolios. This is the common approach used to test for 
                                                 
18 We also conducted but did not tabulate alternative specifications for Table 2. First, we use the average industry 
recommendation per broker or across brokers within a given month as dependent variables. Each dependent variable 
is left censored at 1 and right censored at 3. To account for that, we estimate a Tobit model.  Second, we use an 
upgrade/downgrade approach to define our dependent variables based on changes in industry recommendations. The 
conclusions from these alternative models are similar. 
19  See for example Stickel (1995); Womack (1996); Barber et al. (2001, 2006, 2010), Jegadeesh et al. (2004), Boni 
and Womack (2006), Jacob et al. (1999), Clement (1999), and Dunn and Nathan (2005). 
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information in firm recommendations (e.g., Barber et al., 2001, 2006, 2010; Boni and Womack, 
2006).20 
4.1 Recommendation Portfolios  
We first aggregate the industry recommendations to create monthly consensus industry 
recommendations. To avoid neglected industries, facilitate aggregation of information across 
brokers, and to mitigate some of the errors associated with GICS misclassification (see Section 
2.3) we compute the average industry recommendation of industries for which we have at least 
three recommendations during a month.21 We compute the monthly consensus by averaging all 
the industry recommendations issued during that month by all the brokers in our sample.22 To 
illustrate, assume that brokers issued 10 recommendations for firms in the Media industry in 
month t, then the consensus recommendation for the Media industry would be the average of the 
industry recommendations recorded from the ‘btext’ field in those 10 recommendations. This 
approach allows us to capture changes in industry recommendations during a month. For 
example, if a broker changed her recommendation for the Media industry from ‘1’ to ‘2’ during 
the month, then the consensus for month t will be affected by this change.  
By aggregating industry recommendations from different brokers we reduce the 
idiosyncratic component associated with the signal obtained by each broker. Note that finding 
across-industry expertise associated with a consensus measure is indicative of such expertise at 
the individual analyst level. Indeed, if individual analysts’ signals were pure noise, then their 
aggregations would have no value to investors.23 
Next, in each month t we refer to the consensus recommendation for an industry as 
“optimistic” if this consensus is less than or equal to 1.5. We refer to the consensus 
recommendation as “pessimistic” if it is greater than or equal to 2.5. In all other cases, we refer 
                                                 
20 Another common approach involves looking at investors’ short-term reactions to newly issued recommendations. 
Since this approach depends on knowing the exact recommendation issuance day, it cannot be applied here. 
21  It can be formally shown that this approach diminishes the mismeasurement associated with the industry 
classification error. Details are available from the authors upon request. 
22 Notice that the term consensus here is short for the average of recently issued (that is, issued in the current month) 
recommendations. This contrasts with the meaning of consensus adopted by many papers in the literature, in which 
it refers to the average of all recommendations that are outstanding in a specific moment. Thus, our approach for 
measuring the consensus avoids stale recommendations at the cost of being less comprehensive. 
23 Our approach to aggregating recommendations is similar in spirit to what has been done in the firm-level analysts’ 
literature. For example, Barber et al. (2006) construct portfolios to which they add firm recommendations, and 
whose returns are effectively returns to aggregate recommendation portfolios and Boni and Womack (2006) build an 
aggregate variable based on recommendations of different analysts. 
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to the consensus as “neutral.” We then construct three industry portfolios based on changes in 
the consensus. Portfolio UI (for ‘Upgrade Industry’) in month t consists of all industries that 
were upgraded to “optimistic” during month t-1, Portfolio DI (for ‘Downgrade Industry’) 
consists of all industries that were downgraded to “pessimistic” during month t-1, and Portfolio 
NI  (for ‘Neutral Industry’) consists of all industries that were either upgraded or downgraded 
into the “neutral” consensus during month t-1.24 This approach of building investment portfolios 
based on changes (revisions) in recommendations is consistent with literature on firm 
recommendations (e.g. Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Barber et al., 2006, 2010). 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
Panel A of Table 3 presents summary statistics related to the three portfolios and the 
portfolio formation procedure. First, note that Portfolios UI and NI are well defined in all 87 
months of our sample period. By contrast, Portfolio DI (the downgrade to pessimistic portfolio) 
is only defined in 65 months. Thus, there are 22 months in which there aren’t any industries 
whose consensus was downgraded to “pessimistic.” The average number of industries belonging 
to Portfolios UI, NI, and DI in a given month is 5.5, 10.4, and 2.8, respectively.  
Panel A of Table 3 reveals that the different industries are quite evenly distributed among 
the three portfolios. Over our sample period 65 out of the 68 industries belonged to Portfolio UI 
at some point. Portfolio DI is the least represented, but still around two thirds of the industries 
belonged to this portfolio at some point. This suggests that the classification to the three 
portfolios is not degenerate, and can potentially contain information.  
4.2 Raw Returns 
Using CRSP data we calculate a monthly return for each one of the three portfolios in 
two steps. First, we calculate a month t industry return for each one of the GICS industries. This 
is the value-weighted return across all CRSP firms in the relevant industry, where the weights are 
based on market values at the end of month t-1.25,26 Second, we calculate the monthly return for 
portfolios UI, NI, and DI as the equal weighted return of all industries in the relevant portfolio. 
                                                 
24 In unreported results, we also examine breaking down Portfolio NI, depending on whether an industry was 
upgraded or downgraded towards “neutral.” None of the conclusions presented in the paper changes under this 
different breakdown.  
25 The most obvious and least costly way to “buy” or “sell” an industry is to buy or sell the appropriate industry 
ETF. By calculating the industry return as a weighted average of all CRSP firms in this industry we essentially 
replicate the return on the corresponding industry ETF. 
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Panel B of Table 3 reports raw monthly returns related to different time periods for each 
of the three portfolios. To interpret the results, recall that portfolios in month t are formed based 
on consensus industry recommendations in month t-1. First, in both t-1 and t-2 the average 
returns are monotonically decreasing as we move from Portfolio UI to Portfolio DI. Consistent 
with the logit results, these trends suggest that analysts chase industry momentum. As for 
predictability, the month t average return on Portfolio UI is 1.3%, which is significantly different 
from Portfolio DI’s return of 0.1%. Moreover, a hedged portfolio long in Portfolio UI and short 
in Portfolio DI, during the 65 months in which Portfolio DI exists, yields a significant 1.4% per 
month. When examining the returns of the different portfolios starting from month t+1, we do 
not find a significant difference between the three portfolios, except in the case of 12 months 
returns. Note that these are buy-and-hold returns that ignore changes in recommendations during 
the holding period.  
4.3 Risk-Adjusted Returns 
We next turn to evaluating whether portfolios based on industry recommendations can 
generate abnormal returns. We estimate both in-sample and out-of-sample alphas of each 
industry portfolio relative to the Fama-French four factors (excess market return, HML, SMB, 
and UMD). For our in-sample analysis we regress the excess returns of the portfolios on the four 
Fama-French factors over a period of 60 months similar to Barber et al. (2001, 2006). The 
intercept from this regression is an estimate of the in-sample alpha. Our out-of-sample approach 
is similar to Brennan et al. (1998) and Chordia et al. (2001). For each month in our sample 
period, we regress the monthly excess returns of the portfolios on the returns of the Fama-French 
four factors during the preceding 60 months. Thus, for each month we obtain an estimate of the 
factor loadings. Next, for each month we calculate the out-of-sample alpha as the realized excess 
return of the portfolio less the expected excess return calculated from the realized returns on the 
factors and the estimates of the factor loadings. For each of the three portfolios we thus obtain a 
time series of out-of-sample alpha estimates. We can then use a t-test to estimate whether the 
average alpha is significant. 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 If a firm is delisted at time t, its monthly return plus its delisting return from CRSP are used in the computation of 
its industry return. If a firm has a missing return at time t, we exclude it from the computation of the industry return. 
In a robustness test we replace missing returns of a firm in month t with the market return during that month; results 
are not sensitive to this change.  
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In both analyses we include the abnormal returns obtained from a short-term investment 
of one month, and longer term investments of 3, 6, and 12 months. In the long-term analyses we 
assume that investors keep track of recommendations and change their portfolio accordingly. 
Thus, we keep an industry in the portfolio as long as its average industry recommendation does 
not negate the original signal or until the end of the horizon. For example, if an industry is 
upgraded to optimistic in a given month and enters into portfolio UI, we keep it in the portfolio 
as long as its monthly average recommendation remains within the optimistic threshold (or no 
new industry recommendation is available) or until the end of the investment horizon.  
Consider first the returns using the one-month horizon presented in Table 4. Both the in-
sample (Panel A) and the out-of-sample (Panel B) analyses show a positive and significant alpha 
for the optimistic portfolio and a negative and significant alpha for the pessimistic portfolio. For 
example, the average out-of-sample alpha of portfolio UI is 0.59% per month, significant at the 
1% level. By contrast, portfolio DI generates a negative out-of-sample alpha of 0.9% per month. 
A hedged portfolio long in portfolio UI and short in portfolio DI yields a significant abnormal 
return of about 1.4% per month both in- and out-of-sample sample.27  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Now, consider the abnormal returns associated with longer investment horizons. Here the 
results are somewhat different in the two analyses. In the in-sample analysis presented in Panel A 
we still find abnormal returns for investment horizons of up to 12 months. For example, the long-
short portfolio in Panel A shows significant abnormal returns for 3, 6, and 12 month horizons. 
By contrast, in the out-of-sample analysis the results do not suggest any long-term predictability. 
We interpret these results as saying that, to the extent that there is a long-term value in the 
recommendation portfolios, it is weaker than in the short term.  
For robustness we performed the same analysis relaxing the requirement of at least three 
recommendations for an industry to calculate the monthly average. The results are similar to 
those in Table 4, although they are somewhat smaller in magnitude. This is consistent with our 
expectation that removing the requirement is likely to increase the frequency of industry 
misclassifications, and thereby weaken the informativeness of the industry consensus.  
                                                 
27 Note that the hedged portfolio can only be held about 9 months in each year because portfolio DI only exists about 
75% of the time. Hence an estimate of the annualized abnormal return of the hedged portfolio is 1.4%*9=12.6% 
(assuming that whenever portfolio DI does not exist, the investment strategy has zero alpha). 
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One might also wonder whether the results are attributed exclusively to a “bull” or a 
“bear” market. Note that our time period covers both, and in particular it includes the recent 
global financial crisis as well as the “bull” markets that preceded and followed it. As a 
robustness check, we test whether the results of Table 4 are reversed during the bear market of 
2008. Of course, any such analysis is suggestive only, as it is based on just 12 monthly 
observations. We find that the in-sample and out-of-sample alphas for these 12 months are 
insignificant over almost all investment horizons, which is what one would expect given the lack 
of power. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the alphas for 2008 are equal to the 
alphas during the rest of our sample period. Thus, it appears that the results are not reversed 
during the bear market of 2008.  
The predictive value of industry recommendations may seem surprising, particularly 
given that our portfolios are formed based on industry recommendations that are potentially 
stale. Indeed, the portfolios are formed only at the end of each month. It is important to note, 
however, that much of the predictability that we identify comes from short selling a small group 
of industries that are in Portfolio DI (see Panel A of Table 3). The difference between the 
abnormal returns in Portfolios UI and NI (which together account for more than 90% of the 
industries) is not statistically significant.  
As a final robustness test we also examine the relation between industry 
recommendations and future industry performance proxied by return on assets (ROA), 
controlling for current and past ROA. The results (available upon request) suggest that more 
optimistic industry recommendations are associated with higher industry ROA for up to four 
quarters following the recommendations. These results are consistent with analysts possessing 
expertise in identifying industries with future favorable fundamentals, lending credence to our 
main analysis of returns. 
4.4 Discussion 
Collectively, the evidence so far suggests that analysts possess across-industry expertise, 
and can identify “hot” and “cold” industries over short horizons of one month. When it comes to 
longer horizons the evidence is less conclusive and is limited to the in-sample analysis. 
It is worth emphasizing the considerable controversy regarding the investment value of 
analysts’ outputs. Generally, the literature on analysts’ forecasts did not find conclusive evidence 
20 
 
of subsequent superior stock price performance. With recommendations the evidence is mixed. 
Several studies (e.g., those discussed in the Introduction) argue that analysts’ stock 
recommendations are informative. However, Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) are skeptical of this 
evidence, arguing that same-day price reactions associated with stock recommendations merely 
reflect firms’ specific news released shortly before the recommendations were issued.  
Note that our conclusion regarding the across-industry expertise of analysts is not likely 
to be subject to this criticism. First, our exploration of across-industry expertise relies on 
industry-level recommendations. These recommendations are often issued by strategists for all 
industries at the same time, as opposed to firm recommendations which are issued sporadically 
for each firm in response to firm specific news.28 Thus, it is hard to argue that the returns we 
identify just reflect strategists “piggybacking” on some industry-specific news. Second, even if 
industry recommendations just follow some news events, our empirical approach eliminates the 
spurious predictability discussed in Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) by relying on stale 
recommendations only. Indeed, we construct our portfolio only at the end of the month in which 
the recommendations become available on IBES. Thus, any news-related same-day returns that 
might have triggered the issuance of the recommendations are excluded from the analysis.  
The evidence in Ljungqvist et al. (2009) also casts doubt on predictability results 
associated with analysts’ recommendations. They show that some of the return predictability 
found by researchers stems from problems with the IBES data from 2002-2004. The IBES files 
we used were downloaded in 2008 and 2009, and to the best of our knowledge are free from 
these data problems.29 
5 Relation between Across-Industry and Within-Industry Expertise 
In the previous section we presented evidence consistent with analysts’ across-industry 
expertise as reflected in the investment value of their industry recommendations. In this section 
we explore the relation between across-industry and within-industry expertise. Specifically, we 
examine to what extent industry and firm recommendations are related, whether they reflect 
distinct pieces of information, and whether they can be jointly used to enhance the investment 
value of analysts’ recommendations. 
                                                 
28 For example, some strategists issue industry recommendations for all industries as part of the periodic macro-
economic outlook published by the economics and strategy group of the brokerage house. 
29 We thank Alexander Ljungqvist and Felicia Marston for advising us on this issue. 
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5.1 Preliminary Analysis 
It seems reasonable that industry and firm recommendations are at least somewhat 
related. Industry analysis helps the analyst understand the prospects of an industry, but also is 
useful in evaluating the prospects of each firm in the industry. The analyst can also study many 
firms in the industry and then extract common aspects that help her understand the prospects of 
the industry as a whole compared to other industries. Both approaches suggest that the outlooks 
expressed at the industry and firm levels should be related. On the other hand, relatedness does 
not imply perfect alignment between recommendations at the industry and firm levels. In fact, 
one can view a firm’s prospects as driven by two components, one linked to its industry’s overall 
prospects and the other associated with the firm’s idiosyncratic characteristics – allowing, for 
example, for existence of winners and losers in the same industry. Moreover, industry and firm 
recommendations may be misaligned since they are often determined by analysts in different 
groups, which may not be perfectly coordinated. Therefore, we expect the outlooks expressed at 
the industry and firm levels to be related, but only to a certain degree. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Table 5 provides a preliminary look at the interaction between industry and firm 
recommendations. As with industry recommendations, we map firm recommendations into three 
levels, coding optimistic recommendations (“strong buy” or “buy”) as ‘1’, neutral 
recommendations (“hold”) as ‘2’, and pessimistic recommendations (“sell” or “strong sell”) as 
‘3’.30 The table reveals a significant variation in firm recommendations within each level of 
industry recommendation. For example, out of the firm recommendations issued with an 
optimistic industry recommendation, 42% are rated optimistic, 45% are rated neutral, and 13% 
are rated pessimistic. We also see a wide dispersion of firm recommendations issued with neutral 
and pessimistic industry recommendation. The average firm recommendation for firms in 
industries rated as optimistic is 1.71, in industries rated neutral is 1.81, and in industries rated 
pessimistic is 1.96 – and the differences between these numbers are significant. Thus, there is 
some positive correlation between industry and firm recommendations. However, the dispersion 
in firm recommendations for a given level of industry recommendation suggests that industry 
and firm recommendations contain different information.  
                                                 
30 Given that our sample period starts in September 2002, most of the brokers follow a 3-tier rating scheme for their 
firms recommendations. See Kadan et al. (2009). 
22 
 
5.2 The Benchmark for Firm Recommendations 
To better understand the relation between within- and across-industry expertise, it is 
necessary to know whether firm recommendations reflect information about the industry. That is, 
does a ‘buy’ recommendation issued to a firm reflect a buying opportunity relative to the entire 
market, or relative to industry peers?  
If firm recommendations are benchmarked to industry peers, then firm and industry 
recommendations should contain orthogonal information. While industry recommendations 
forecast the outlook for the industry as a whole, firm recommendations forecast the deviations of 
specific firms from the industry outlook. In this case, industry recommendations have 
independent value to investors. Furthermore, firm specific recommendations should not be 
interpreted outside of their industry context. Hence, combining industry and firm 
recommendations would add value to investors. 
If, on the other hand, firm recommendations are benchmarked to the market, then they 
incorporate both systematic industry information (across-industry) as well as firm-specific 
information (within-industry). If, in addition, firm-level outlooks are used as inputs when 
industry outlooks are established (e.g., through proper sharing of information between strategists 
and firm-level analysts), we expect industry recommendations to reflect an aggregation of firm 
recommendations. In this case, industry recommendations are to some extent a repackaging of 
multiple firm recommendations, and they do not carry much incremental value to investors 
beyond firm recommendations. Under this scenario, combining industry and firm 
recommendations would not add much value to investors (less than the value in the case of 
recommendations benchmarked against the industry). 
5.2.1 Analysis of Brokers’ Disclosures 
In order to understand how firm recommendations are benchmarked, we start by 
examining the disclosures of analysts regarding the meaning they assign to their firm 
recommendations. Under regulations NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, which were 
adopted prior to the beginning of our sample period, analysts are required to disclose the 
meaning of their recommendations inside their reports. We examined these disclosures for the 20 
largest brokers (in terms of numbers of recommendations). Table 6 summarizes our findings. Out 
of the 20 brokers, 10 brokers state that they benchmark their firm recommendations to industry 
peers – including the six largest brokers in our industry recommendations sample. We refer to 
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these brokers as “industry benchmarkers.” For example, in the case of CIBC, analysts rate 
individual stocks based on the “stock’s expected performance vs. the sector.” In contrast, the 
other 10 brokers state that they benchmark their recommendations to the entire market or to a 
specific threshold return. We refer to such brokers as “market benchmarkers.” For example, 
Wachovia’s analysts rate a stock based on the stock’s expected performance “relative to the 
market over the next 12 months.” Thus, the disclosures in Table 6 suggest that brokers differ, 
according to their statements, in their interpretation of firm recommendations. 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
5.2.2 Pseudo Industry Recommendations 
The fact that brokers state that they use a specific benchmark is anecdotal only. We next 
examine empirically which benchmark is in fact being used. As explained above, if brokers use 
an industry benchmark for their firm recommendations, then their firm recommendations will 
contain no industry-wide information. By contrast, if brokers use a market benchmark, then their 
firm recommendations will have information regarding industry outlook.  This observation 
enables us to construct a simple test as follows. In each month we construct a “pseudo industry 
recommendation” by value weighting all recommendations issued during that month to firms 
belonging to the specific GICS industry. That is, the pseudo industry recommendations mirror 
the “true” industry recommendations studied in the paper. Only that, instead of obtaining them 
directly from IBES, we construct them by aggregating firm recommendations on an industry 
level [similar to Boni and Womack (2006)]. 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
Panel A of Table 7 presents summary statistics of pseudo industry recommendations. 
First, the average pseudo industry recommendation for all brokers is 1.62. By comparison, the 
average real industry recommendation is somewhat less optimistic at 1.85. We then distinguish 
between two sets of brokers based on the analysis in Table 6. The average pseudo industry 
recommendation for industry benchmarkers is 1.71, while the average for market benchmarkers 
is a bit more optimistic at 1.62. Overall, there does not seem to be a large economic difference 
between the two sub-groups in the level of their recommendations. 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the correlation matrix between the different types of pseudo 
industry recommendations and the true industry recommendations. There is little correlation, 
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ranging from 0.10 to 0.15, between the pseudo industry recommendations and the true industry 
recommendations, suggesting that true industry recommendations are very different in their 
informational content from just an aggregation of firm recommendations. For the industry 
benchmarkers the correlation is 0.14. Such a low correlation is expected given these brokers’ 
claims that their firm recommendations are benchmarked to industry peers – and thus are not 
expected to contain much industry information. The more surprising result is that the correlation 
between the true and pseudo industry recommendations among the market benchmarkers is still 
just 0.10. Here we would expect pseudo industry recommendations to somewhat reflect across-
industry expertise, and thus be more correlated with industry outlooks. The low correlations we 
find raise the possibility that while market benchmarkers state that they use a market benchmark 
for their firm recommendations, in practice they may still benchmark to industry peers.31 
To more formally investigate this issue we repeat the analysis from Table 4 using the 
pseudo industry recommendations. Boni and Womack (2006) conduct a similar analysis. The 
idea is that if pseudo industry recommendations reflect across-industry expertise and have 
predictive information regarding the industry, then portfolios based on pseudo industry 
recommendations will demonstrate abnormal returns. Panel C of Table 7 presents the results. As 
in Tables 3 and 4, we define portfolios of upgraded, neutral, and downgraded industries based on 
changes in industry outlooks, except that this time the industry outlooks are expressed by pseudo 
industry recommendations. More specifically, in each month we sort industries by their 
consensus pseudo industry recommendation and define the portfolios PUI (for pseudo upgraded 
industries), PNI (pseudo neutral industries), and PDI (for pseudo downgraded industries). Then, 
we calculate the one month in-sample and out-of-sample alphas of the three portfolios and of a 
portfolio that is long in Portfolio PUI and short in Portfolio PDI.  
Consider first the results for all brokers (both in-sample and out-of-sample). The alphas 
are not different from zero for the three portfolios as well as for the long-short portfolio. This is 
consistent with the findings of Boni and Womack (2006, page 106). Similar results obtain for the 
industry benchmarkers. The results for market benchmarkers are different. The in-sample results 
show significantly positive alphas for portfolio PUI and significantly negative alphas for 
                                                 
31 Note that the “true” industry recommendations in this case are typically not issued by the market benchmarkers. 
Therefore, another alternative, of course, is that market benchmarkers have strikingly different views about industry 
prospects when compared to the views expressed in the explicit industry recommendations by the brokers in our 
sample. Another possible explanation for the low correlations is the relative staleness of industry recommendations. 
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portfolio PDI. The long-short portfolio is also statistically significant. The out-of-sample alphas 
are somewhat weaker as only the upgraded portfolio shows significance. These results are 
consistent with the disclosure of these brokers, and suggest that firm recommendations issued by 
market-benchmarkers reflect some industry expertise. 
Our conclusion from this analysis is that it is important to pay attention to the benchmark 
used by brokers for their firm recommendations when examining the across-industry information 
incorporated in them. For industry benchmarkers the results show that true industry 
recommendations are different from just an aggregation of firm recommendations. While the 
former contains information regarding industry outlooks and reflects analysts’ across-industry 
expertise, the latter does not reflect that expertise. This is in line with the low correlation 
between the real- and pseudo-industry recommendations, documented in Panel B. Among market 
benchmarkers, where we do expect pseudo industry recommendations to somewhat reflect 
across-industry expertise, we find some predictive power (mostly in the in-sample analysis). 
Thus, our results provide more nuanced conclusions regarding the across-industry information in 
aggregations of firm-recommendations than those in Boni and Womack (2006). It is worth 
emphasizing that Boni and Womack (2006) employ data before 2002, a period during which 
brokers were not required to disclose their benchmarks.  
Two caveats are in order regarding comparisons between pseudo and true industry 
recommendations. First, it is often the case that we do not obtain firm recommendations for all 
firms in the industry in any given month. For this simple reason, true industry recommendations 
are likely to contain more information than pseudo industry recommendations. Second, the 
potential misalignment between analysts’ definitions of industries and the GICS definition might 
create a further rift between true and pseudo industry recommendations.  
5.3 Combining Across- and Within-Industry Expertise 
The results so far suggest that true industry recommendations reflect across-industry 
expertise and carry value to investors that is unrelated to information in firm recommendations, 
and more so for industry-benchmarkers. Prior research demonstrates that firm recommendations 
also have investment value. Jointly, these two observations suggest that combining firm and 
industry recommendations will enhance their value to investors. Such combinations would 
reflect both within- and across-industry expertise of analysts. In this section we explore this idea.  
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A reasonable approach to exploit both aspects of expertise consists of first selecting 
industries using industry recommendations, and then using firm recommendations to choose 
firms within the selected industries. This approach extracts the full power of analysts’ knowledge 
as it incorporates their signals both within-industry (mostly driven by a bottom-up analysis) and 
across industries (mostly driven by a top-down analysis).  
As a start, we follow Boni and Womack (2006) in classifying firms based on upgrades 
and downgrades in firm recommendations. For each firm covered by IBES and each month 
during our sample period, we count the number of upgrades and downgrades that the firm 
received. An upgrade (downgrade) on firm i by broker B in month t means that B issued a 
recommendation for i in month t that was more optimistic (pessimistic) than the most recent 
recommendation issued by B to i. Thus, we ignore reiterations of recommendations, or initiations 
of coverage. We then compute the difference between the number of upgrades and the number of 
downgrades for each month and firm across all brokers. If the difference is positive, then the firm 
is a “net upgrade.”  Conversely, if the difference is negative, then the firm is a “net downgrade.”   
<Insert Table 8 here> 
We next combine firm and industry recommendations. In each month we perform a 
double-sort of the universe of firms based on the firm classification (whether “net upgraded” or 
“net downgraded”) and on its industry classification (belonging to either one of the three industry 
portfolios described in the previous section) that were prevailing in the previous month. 
Therefore, within each of the three industry portfolios, we form two portfolios based on firm 
recommendations, one for the net upgraded firms (Portfolio UF) and one for the net downgraded 
firms (Portfolio DF). This generates six portfolios of firms. For example, (UI,UF) is the portfolio 
of net upgraded firms in upgraded industries. Returns on each portfolio are obtained from equal-
weighting the returns on their stocks. Similar to the analysis in Section 4.3, we analyze in-sample 
and out-of-sample abnormal returns obtained from a short investment horizon of one month, and 
longer horizons of 3, 6, and 12 months. The abnormal returns of the double-sorted portfolios are 
reported in Table 8.  
Consider first the one-month horizon. Both the in-sample and out-of-sample results 
support the idea that combining industry and firm recommendations enhances investment value. 
For example, whether net upgraded firms show abnormal returns depends on their industry 
outlook: such net upgraded stocks have significantly positive alphas if they are part of the 
27 
 
industries with optimistic outlook (UI,UF) or neutral outlook (NI,UF), but not when they are part 
of the industries with the worst outlook (DI,UF). In a similar fashion, net downgraded stocks 
have significantly negative alphas when part of a pessimistic industry (DI,DF), but not when they 
are part of an optimistic industry (UI,DF) or a neutral industry (NI,DF). In fact, when a firm is a 
net downgrade but belongs to an industry in Portfolio UI, it generates positive abnormal returns 
in both the in-sample and out-of-sample analyses. A trading strategy long in the top-left portfolio 
(UI,UF) and short in the bottom-right portfolio (DI,DF) yields a monthly abnormal return of over 
3% in both analyses. These returns are larger than those obtained in Table 4 using industry 
recommendations only.  
For the longer investment horizons we follow a methodology similar to that used in 
Section 4.3. That is, we include a firm in a portfolio until the end of the investment horizon or 
until the signal (on either the firm or the industry) changes. If there are no new recommendations 
(for either the firm or the industry) in a given month, we assume that the signal remains 
consistent in that month.32 The alphas for longer investment horizons up to 12 months are 
consistent in sign and significance but somewhat lower in magnitude compared to the one-month 
results. For example, when examining in-sample alphas over a 12-month horizon, a portfolio 
long in (UI,UF) and short in (DI,DF) yields a monthly abnormal return of 2.3%. 
Given that firm recommendations carry different meanings for market- and industry-
benchmarkers, it is interesting to repeat this analysis separately for these two groups. Since 
industry-benchmarkers aim only at ranking firms within industries, the combination of industry- 
and firm-recommendations is likely to be especially beneficial for investors when considering 
the recommendations of such analysts. By contrast, for market-benchmarkers, firm 
recommendations already reflect some industry outlooks, and combining the two types of 
recommendations is likely to add less value to investors for such analysts. Our data only allows 
us to directly test the first of these two assertions, because the vast majority (97.8%) of industry 
recommendations in our sample are issued by brokers that rely on an industry benchmark. As 
expected, when we restrict attention to industry benchmarkers only, the results corresponding to 
Table 8 (untabulated for brevity) become stronger. For example, for the one month investment 
                                                 
32 Notice that Boni and Womack (2006) focused on one-month returns only. Therefore, for horizons beyond one 
month, our methodology extends theirs by allowing the firm’s and industry’s signals to remain valid for up to 12 
months. An alternative is to allow the classification of industries to be extended to long horizons while still using 
one month-ahead returns with respect to the firm’s signal. Results (unreported) of this alternative yield similar 
conclusions.  
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horizon, a portfolio long in (UI,UF) and short in (DI,DF) generates an out-of-sample alpha of 
3.7% and an in-sample alpha of 5%. 
Overall, the results in this section reinforce the conclusion that industry recommendations 
contain information that is not already incorporated in firm recommendations. While firm 
recommendations often reflect within-industry expertise and focus on ranking stocks within 
industries, industry recommendations reflect across-industry expertise enabling investors to rank 
industries. Thus, combining the two types of recommendations exploits both dimensions of 
analysts’ industry expertise and generates investment portfolios that outperform portfolios based 
on just one type of recommendation (firm or industry).  
6 Alternative Explanations 
While the results in the previous sections are consistent with analysts possessing across-
industry expertise, they may also be consistent with two alternative explanations, which we 
consider in this section. 
6.1 Industry Momentum 
It may be that analysts do not possess any expertise in analyzing the prospects of 
different industries. Rather, they just chase industry momentum providing no added value 
beyond it.  In this case, the abnormal returns we observe are nothing but a result of this well 
documented phenomenon [Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)]. In this section, we conduct several 
tests to explore this possibility.  
First, in each month during our sample period we assign each GICS industry into one of 
three momentum portfolios based on prior six months returns as follows. Portfolio MOM1 
contains industries in the top 15% of the prior-return distribution; Portfolio MOM3 contains 
industries in the bottom 15% of the prior-return distribution, and portfolio MOM2 contains all 
the rest of the industries. We choose these cutoffs to be as consistent as possible with  
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), who define winner (loser) industries as the top (bottom) three 
out of a total of 20 industries. We then double sort the industry-month observations based on 
their assigned industry recommendations and industry momentum portfolios. The results in Panel 
A of Table 9 indicate only a mild positive correlation between industry recommendations and 
industry momentum. For example, when considering industries assigned to recommendation 
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portfolio UI (optimistic), 18% of them exhibit high momentum (portfolio MOM1), 70% are in 
portfolio MOM2, and 12% exhibit low momentum (portfolio MOM3). Out of the industry-month 
observations that belong to recommendation portfolio UI (pessimistic), 10% show high 
momentum, 69% show moderate momentum, and 21% show negative momentum. These results 
show that, while a positive correlation exists, analysts do not blindly follow industry momentum.  
<Insert Table 9 here> 
Next, note that if analysts were defining their industry recommendations based mostly on 
past performance, our strategy for forming portfolios based on recommendations would be at 
best an imperfect replica of the industry momentum strategy. In this sense, an industry 
momentum strategy like in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) should yield “better” or cleaner 
results than our strategy. Thus, we compare the one-month abnormal returns of the long-short 
strategy resulting from the industry recommendation portfolios to those obtained from a long-
short momentum strategy. The results of this test are reported in Panel B of Table 9. For both the 
in-sample and out-of-sample analysis, neither portfolio MOM1 nor portfolio MOM3 exhibit 
significant abnormal returns in the month following their formation.  The return on the hedged 
portfolio is insignificant in the in-sample analysis, and surprisingly negative in the out-of-sample 
analysis. More importantly, the difference between the alpha of the long-short recommendation 
portfolio and that of the momentum portfolio is positive and highly significant (p-value lower 
than 0.01), indicating that the abnormal returns associated with the recommendation portfolio are 
not attributed to industry momentum. 
In our next test we attempt to directly isolate the effects of industry momentum on 
industry recommendations. We do so by excluding from recommendation portfolio UI all 
industries that belong to the high momentum portfolio MOM1. That is, we only consider 
industries that have high industry recommendations but do not exhibit high past returns. 
Similarly, we exclude from industry recommendation portfolio DI all industries belonging to 
momentum portfolio MOM3. The one-month abnormal returns are reported in Panel C of Table 
9. For both the in-sample and out-of-sample analysis the long-short portfolio exhibits a positive 
and highly significant alpha. This is a strong indication that industry momentum is not 
responsible for the observed abnormal returns on industry recommendation portfolios. 
As a final test for the “momentum hypothesis” we checked the return predictability of 
industry recommendations using the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional approach. This allows us to 
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control for different characteristics affecting stock returns (such as momentum) directly, rather 
than using a factor approach. For each month in our sample we estimated a cross-sectional 
regression with industry excess returns as a dependent variable, and industry characteristics as 
independent variables. The characteristics we used are: beta, size, book-to-market, momentum, 
and the industry-consensus portfolio to which the industry belongs (Port) or the industry 
consensus recommendation (Ind_Rec). For this analysis we set Port to equal 1, 2, or 3 when the 
industry belongs to industry portfolio UI, NI, or DI, respectively. We then average the 
coefficients over time and use a t-test to examine their statistical significance. The results are 
reported in Panel D of Table 9. We observe a significantly negative coefficient on either Port or 
Ind_Rec, indicating that industry recommendations have predictive ability with respect to next 
month’s industry returns, and confirming our results from Table 4. Importantly, we observe this 
relation after controlling for the cumulative industry return in the previous six months, which 
turns out not to be significant.  
In sum, the results in this section suggest that the predictive ability in industry 
recommendations is not a manifestation of industry momentum. 
6.2 Short-Term Price Pressure and Sentiment 
It may be that analysts do not possess any expertise in analyzing the prospects of 
different industries. Rather, analysts’ industry recommendations create a “hype” or sentiment for 
some industries which is followed by a wide migration of investors to or away from those 
industries. In that case, the abnormal returns we observe merely reflect the short-term price 
pressure (either positive or negative) created by this migration. If that is the case, then the returns 
following industry recommendations should be short lived. That is, in the long-run prices will 
revert to fundamentals undoing the short-term price pressure. A similar phenomenon (in a 
different context) is documented in Ben-Rephael et al. (2012). They show that mutual-fund 
investors chase sentiment when switching between equity and bond funds. However, short-term 
returns obtained from this approach are reversed within one year. 
To distinguish between this alternative explanation and the “industry expertise” 
hypothesis we examine whether the short-term abnormal returns obtained from following 
industry recommendations are reversed within one year. First, recall from Table 4 and Table 8 
that the long-term returns following industry recommendations are smaller in magnitude 
compared to the one-month returns (and at times they become insignificant). These results 
31 
 
suggest that some of the returns are indeed reversed. However, a formal test for reversal should 
directly examine the long-term returns, excluding the first month. To this end, we repeat the 
analysis presented in Table 4 and Table 8, skipping the first month. The results (untabulated, 
available upon request) for both the in-sample and out-of-sample analysis show either 
insignificant or significant and positive alphas for the long-short portfolios for all investment 
horizons. Thus, our tests do not identify any reversals in the period following the first month 
after portfolio formation. 
Our interpretation of these tests along with the results in Table 4 is that the abnormal 
returns associated with industry recommendation may be partially attributed to price pressure. 
However, given that we cannot identify reversals explicitly, and since abnormal returns are still 
significant over the longer horizon (in Table 8 and in the in-sample analysis in Table 4), it seems 
that across-industry expertise still plays a role in explaining the results. 
7 Conclusion 
Industry analysis is an important aspect of sell-side research. It is likely composed of 
both analysts’ ability to rank firms within an industry (carried out by firm-level analysts) as well 
as analysts’ ability to rank industries relative to each other (largely carried out by strategy 
analysts). Our paper focuses on exploring analysts across-industry expertise and its relation to 
analysts’ within-industry expertise. We perform our analysis using industry recommendation 
data that became available on IBES in 2002. This is a major output of analysts’ research that has 
not been explored so far.  
Institutional investors assign a high level of importance to analysts’ industry expertise – 
as reflected in the Institutional Investor Magazine survey (cited in the Introduction), and in the 
awards granted to strategists based on their industry recommendations. Our results suggest that 
analysts do possess across-industry expertise as reflected in the investment value of their 
industry recommendations. Furthermore, the results highlight the importance of this new facet of 
analysts’ outputs. As we show, industry recommendations incorporate information that is distinct 
from that conveyed by firm recommendations. Thus, combining the across- and within-industry 
expertise of analysts is beneficial. A caveat to these conclusions is that our results only pertain to 
brokerage houses that disclose industry recommendations. It could be that the disclosure decision 
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is related to brokerage houses’ efforts and abilities to analyze the prospects of industries. 
Consequently, these inferences may not extend to other brokerage houses. 
Another important element of our study is that the analysis of industry recommendations 
enables us to better understand the meaning of firm recommendations. Firm-level analysts differ 
in their disclosures regarding the benchmark for their firm recommendations. Our empirical 
findings suggest that these differences are only partly reflected in the information contained in 
firm recommendations.  
Being the first paper to study analysts’ across-industry expertise as reflected in industry 
recommendations, several interesting questions remain. First, what is the source of investment 
value in industry recommendations? In particular, is there a link between industry 
recommendations and the subsequent investment decisions of either retail or institutional 
investors? Second, given the importance of industry knowledge, what is its role in analysts’ 
compensation and reputation? Finally, it is interesting to explore the role of industry expertise in 
the careers and reputation of analysts. For example, given the importance that institutional 
investors assign to industry expertise it would be interesting to explore the relation between these 
expertise and achieving “All Star” status. These are questions to be addressed in future research. 
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Appendix I 
To illustrate how IBES records industry recommendations we present a specific example. 
In January 2006, Bear Stearns published an analyst report on Apple (AAPL). We obtained this 
report from the Investext Plus database. The front page of the report shows that the analyst 
issued an ‘outperform’ recommendation for Apple. Additionally, the front page cites a ‘market 
weight’ recommendation for the IT hardware industry. This recommendation is taken from a 
periodic industry report prepared by a group of analysts at Bear Stearns.  
IBES recorded these recommendations as follows: 
Ticker RECDATS BROKER BTEXT/ETEXT IRECCD 
AAPL 20060112 BEAR OUTPERFORM/MKTWT 2 
Note that the ‘btext’ item includes two words separated by a ‘slash’. The text before the 
slash is the firm recommendation, whereas the text after the slash is the industry 
recommendation. Industry recommendations only appear in this item for brokers that include 
them in the front page of their firm reports.  
Below, we present how we assign numeric values to the text depicting industry 
recommendations. We code optimistic industry recommendations as ‘1’, neutral industry 
recommendations as ‘2’, and pessimistic industry recommendations as ‘3’.  
Optimistic (1) Neutral (2) Pessimistic (3) 
ACCUMULATE CORE HOLD AVOID 
ABOVE AVERAGE IN-LINE CAUTIOUS 
ACC MARKET PERFORM NEGATIVE 
ACCUM MARKETPERFORMER REDUCE 
ACCUMULATE MARKETPERFRM SELL 
ADD MKTWT UNDERPERF. 
ATTRACTIVE MP UNDERPERFORM 
BUY NEUTRAL UNDERWT 
OUTPERFORM   
OVERWT   
POSITIVE   
STRONGBUY   
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Appendix II - Summary Statistics on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
This appendix presents summary statistics on each industry defined by GICS during our sample period (9/2002 – 
12/2009).  For each GICS, the table shows its corresponding industry name, the number of firms in the industry, the 
average market capitalization (in $M) and the average market-to-book ratio across firms in the industry, the number 
of brokerage houses (out of the 33 brokers in Table 1) that issue industry recommendations for this industry at any 
point during our sample period, the average number of brokerage houses which issue recommendations to this 
industry per month, the average number of recommendations issued to this industry per month, and the average level 
of these monthly industry recommendations. The latter is calculated as the average across all months in our sample 
period of the average monthly industry recommendation (which may include duplicate recommendations issued by 
the same broker in a given month). The number of firms in each industry is based on the number of firms in CRSP 
in 2009. The market capitalization and the market-to-book ratio are calculated based on 2009 and 2008 data, 
respectively.  We assign industry recommendations a numeric value as follows: “optimistic”=1, “neutral”=2, 
“pessimistic”=3. The monthly industry recommendation is calculated as the average industry recommendation 
issued to the industry within the month. 
 
GICS Industry_Name 
# of 
firms 
Avg. 
market 
cap 
Avg. 
M/B 
# of 
brokers 
covering 
Avg. # of 
brokers 
issuing 
rec. per 
month 
Avg. # 
of rec. 
per 
month 
Avg. 
monthly 
industry 
rec. 
101010 Energy Equipment & Services 81 3754.50  0.59  11 3.20  13.27  1.28  
101020 Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels 292 5610.73  2.83  14 5.35  34.25  1.74  
151010 Chemicals 89 3797.70  0.74  10 2.42  7.34  1.62  
151020 Construction Materials 12 1602.13  0.49  4 0.35  0.52  1.78  
151030 Containers & Packaging 22 1987.11  0.42  7 1.22  3.09  1.77  
151040 Metals & Mining 138 3567.25  0.95  12 3.51  10.23  1.62  
151050 Paper & Forest Products 18 1895.72  0.30  7 1.48  3.34  2.07  
201010 Aerospace & Defense 68 4618.84  0.75  10 2.17  5.80  1.71  
201020 Building Products 24 857.01  0.58  8 0.60  0.77  1.75  
201030 Construction & Engineering 32 1428.12  0.69  11 0.99  2.13  1.68  
201040 Electrical Equipment 99 1156.36  1.00  13 1.63  3.81  1.58  
201050 Industrial Conglomerates 17 15565.78 0.61  7 1.08  1.73  1.65  
201060 Machinery 121 2230.40  0.71  10 2.68  7.16  1.77  
201070 Trading Companies & Distributors 30 934.12  0.60  8 1.06  1.55  1.80  
202010 Commercial Services & Supplies 94 1062.96  0.80  13 3.13  9.45  1.78  
202020 Professional Services 55 767.29  0.91  5 0.18  0.30  1.84  
203010 Air Freight & Logistics 15 5904.04  1.20  6 1.11  2.50  1.71  
203020 Airlines 22 1688.54  0.28  6 1.90  6.09  1.86  
203030 Marine 27 410.35  0.30  6 0.55  0.91  2.09  
203040 Road & Rail 36 4717.64  0.69  7 1.74  5.52  1.98  
203050 Transportation Infrastructure 9 466.42  0.39  4 0.30  0.52  1.80  
251010 Auto Components 40 1368.98  0.43  8 1.61  4.56  2.30  
251020 Automobiles 8 12861.95 0.26  7 1.02  1.52  2.34  
252010 Household Durables 73 1180.24  0.35  8 1.78  4.83  1.95  
252020 Leisure Equipment & Products 26 727.91  0.50  10 0.74  1.06  1.76  
252030 Textiles, Apparel & Luxury Goods 62 1343.44  0.75  9 1.32  3.26  2.02  
253010 Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure 125 1913.11  0.60  14 4.01  15.27  1.84  
253020 Diversified Consumer Services 41 1282.99  1.96  9 1.19  1.80  1.78  
254010 Media 139 3011.21  0.37  11 4.45  18.97  1.96  
255010 Distributors 11 860.56  0.42  5 0.26  0.26  2.14  
255020 Internet & Catalog Retail 26 3493.56  1.38  11 1.80  3.22  1.63  
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GICS Industry_Name 
# of 
firms 
Avg. 
market 
cap 
Avg. 
M/B 
# of 
brokers 
covering 
Avg. # of 
brokers 
issuing 
rec. per 
month 
Avg. # 
of rec. 
per 
month 
Avg. 
monthly 
industry 
rec. 
255030 Multiline Retail 17 5822.64  0.55  10 1.85  4.06  2.17  
255040 Specialty Retail 121 2406.32  0.56  13 4.30  16.95  2.11  
301010 Food & Staples Retailing 34 10888.92 0.71  8 1.88  4.28  1.87  
302010 Beverages 35 8449.57  0.62  6 1.55  3.58  1.85  
302020 Food Products 77 3724.15  0.79  7 2.01  5.15  2.15  
302030 Tobacco 9 18444.96 4.35  5 0.52  1.14  1.63  
303010 Household Products 13 20228.34 0.74  7 1.01  1.72  1.95  
303020 Personal Products 34 1348.47  1.32  8 1.06  1.63  1.85  
351010 Health Care Equipment & Supplies 154 2277.76  1.32  16 3.33  8.93  1.53  
351020 Health Care Providers & Services 124 2323.75  0.87  12 4.07  18.17  1.69  
351030 Health Care Technology 25 964.09  1.48  9 0.40  0.61  1.68  
352010 Biotechnology 178 1296.45  2.46  14 3.99  11.67  1.54  
352020 Pharmaceuticals 104 7546.38  1.60  12 3.44  9.69  1.59  
352030 Life Sciences Tools & Services 57 1426.58  1.40  7 0.69  1.67  1.63  
401010 Commercial Banks 399 1583.53  0.08  10 2.75  11.35  2.02  
401020 Thrifts & Mortgage Finance 157 333.11  0.10  9 1.43  3.60  1.99  
402010 Diversified Financial Services 39 11373.25 0.83  10 2.25  5.59  1.99  
402020 Consumer Finance 23 3889.49  0.30  10 1.09  1.88  2.02  
402030 Capital Markets 105 4541.15  0.66  10 2.45  8.18  1.87  
403010 Insurance 142 4260.35  0.30  10 3.59  15.38  1.88  
404010 
Real Estate -- Discontinued effective 
04/28/2006    6 1.68  8.53  2.33  
404020 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 148 1974.60  0.38  6 1.28  7.16  2.28  
404030 Real Estate Management & Development 35 1013.77  0.43  6 0.34  0.47  2.13  
451010 Internet Software & Services 101 2688.59  1.10  12 3.20  7.61  1.56  
451020 IT Services 90 2946.92  0.76  10 2.84  8.11  1.75  
451030 Software 168 3677.52  1.31  16 4.32  15.73  1.70  
452010 Communications Equipment 121 2993.19  0.72  14 3.82  11.91  1.77  
452020 Computers & Peripherals 61 10149.39 0.81  14 2.97  8.28  1.81  
452030 
Electronic Equipment, Instruments & 
Components 144 966.18  0.73  10 3.02  7.58  1.82  
452040 Office Electronics 3 3917.73  0.62  6 0.25  0.28  1.84  
452050 
Semiconductor Equipment & Products -- Discontinued effective 
04/30/2003. 11 0.59  5.84  1.76  
453010 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor 
Equipment 150 2559.40  0.80  12 4.13  21.14  1.73  
501010 Diversified Telecommunication Services 70 5223.70  0.37  11 3.45  10.45  1.90  
501020 Wireless Telecommunication Services 32 4739.27  0.46  13 2.89  7.03  1.88  
551010 Electric Utilities 42 5802.72  0.35  7 2.45  8.99  2.28  
551020 Gas Utilities 28 1890.83  0.51  7 1.06  2.34  2.06  
551030 Multi-Utilities 27 5976.77  0.32  9 1.52  3.88  2.25  
551040 Water Utilities 16 678.80  0.67  4 0.19  0.20  2.15  
551050 
Independent Power Producers & Energy 
Traders 14 2864.53  0.29  8 0.72  1.15  2.08  
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics on Brokerage Houses and Industry Recommendations 
Panel A presents summary statistics on the brokerage houses whose industry recommendations are available in 
IBES during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009). We report the broker name, the number of firms receiving 
recommendations from the brokerage house, the number of firm recommendations issued by each brokerage house, 
the average of such firm recommendations, the number of industries with available industry recommendations of 
each brokerage house, and the total number of industry recommendations issued by each brokerage house and 
available in IBES. When calculating the average firm recommendation, we assign firm recommendations a numeric 
value as follows: “strong buy” and “buy”=1, “hold”=2, “underperform” and “sell”=3.  Industries are classified by 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).  Panel B shows the number of industries covered by each of the 
sample’s seven largest brokers for which we have industry recommendations. An industry is considered to be 
covered by a broker in a specific year if there is at least one industry recommendation being issued for that industry 
by the broker. Panel C reports the distribution of the industry recommendations levels over the years for all brokers. 
We assign industry recommendations a numeric value as follows: “optimistic”=1, “neutral”=2, “pessimistic”=3. 
Panel D shows the average industry recommendation for each broker and each year of our sample. 
Panel A – Summary Statistics on Brokerage Houses 
 
Broker  
# of 
firms 
covered 
Total # of  
firm 
recommendations 
Avg. firm 
recommendation 
# of industries 
with industry 
recommendations 
Total # of 
industry 
recommendations 
Goldman Sachs 1904 10163 1.89  70 9985 
Morgan Stanley 1799 7118 1.88  70 7116 
CSFB 2145 9039 1.73  68 6678 
Bear Stearns 1567 5396 1.75  66 5366 
Lehman Bros. 1754 5291 1.76  65 5250 
CIBC 1304 3756 1.81  57 3751 
Barclays 1072 1885 1.70  63 1831 
Sanders M. Harris 324 984 1.52  37 373 
Jonhson Rice 231 857 1.24  17 360 
CE Unterberg 468 1162 1.59  19 256 
Cai Cheuvreux 21 118 1.82  13 69 
Rochdals 85 140 1.60  18 54 
Forun 29 48 1.42  9 46 
HSBC 299 805 1.80  11 35 
Capstone 101 336 1.43  15 29 
Varicorp 44 67 1.46  6 19 
WHENTRAD 36 50 1.64  5 16 
Wasserman 11 15 1.20  6 15 
Summit Analytic 15 37 2.68  2 13 
US Trust  8 9 2.33  1 9 
Cokerpal 33 106 1.24  3 9 
Haywood 16 36 1.39  3 8 
CJS 185 455 1.51  4 5 
Thomas Weisel 1074 2668 1.66  4 4 
Samuel Ramirez 18 19 1.21  3 4 
Allaria Ledesma 3 8 1.38  2 3 
Enskilda 6 12 1.67  2 2 
Merrill Lynch 2829 12183 1.75  1 2 
Anderson Strudwick 10 11 1.00  2 2 
Octagon 2 3 1.33  1 2 
Advest 183 356 1.44  1 1 
Janco 128 382 1.35  1 1 
Caris 381 1206 1.48  1 1 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B – Industry Coverage by Broker and by Year for the Seven Largest Brokers 
 
Broker 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Goldman Sachs 51 54 53 57 65 66 66 64 
Morgan Stanley 49 59 55 56 61 61 61 57 
CSFB 53 57 57 58 61 64 29 - 
Bear Stearns 48 54 49 53 57 56 45 - 
Lehman Bros. 44 56 53 56 60 58 42 - 
CIBC 43 43 40 40 41 41 12 4 
Barclays - - - - - - 62 60 
Number of 
GICS Industries 59 62 62 64 67 67 68 68 
 
 
 
Panel C – Distribution of Industry Recommendations by Year for All Brokers in Sample 
 
Industry 
Recommendation 
(%) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 Overall 
1 33.92  31.62  33.33 32.27 31.26 28.58 28.50  35.22 31.71 
2 52.17  51.01  52.59 52.84 54.97 59.09 59.70  55.72 54.53 
3 13.90  17.37  14.08 14.89 13.77 12.34 11.80  9.06 13.76 
 
 
 
Panel D – Average Industry Recommendations by Broker and Year for the Seven Largest Brokers 
 
Broker 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Overall 
Goldman Sachs 1.89  1.94  1.93  2.02  1.87  1.89  1.91  1.75  1.88  
Morgan Stanley 1.95  2.02  1.90  1.99  1.88  1.77  1.84  1.71  1.88  
CSFB 1.78  1.91  1.79  1.71  1.88  1.86  1.79  -  1.83  
Bear Stearns 1.66  1.93  1.78  1.91  1.84  1.96  1.90  -  1.85  
Lehman Bros. 1.85  1.75  1.78  1.67  1.72  1.70  1.82  -  1.74  
CIBC 1.75  1.72  1.71  1.77  1.74  1.78  1.65  1.64  1.74  
Barclays -  -  -  -  -  -  1.73  1.74  1.73  
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Table 2 – Determinants of Industry Recommendations  
This table reports the results of estimating logistic models of the probabilities of issuing an optimistic or pessimistic industry 
recommendation during our sample period (9/2002-12/2009).  Reiterations during a month are excluded. The independent 
variables are as follows: Industry_Size is the natural logarithm of the aggregate market capitalization of the industry at the 
beginning of the month, MB is the industry weighted average of the market-to-book ratio, Profit is the industry weighted average 
of net income margin, R&D is the industry weighted average of the R&D divided by sales, Capex is the industry weighted 
average of the capital expenditures divided by sales. Accounting variables are measured at the beginning of the year. All 
weighted averages are by the firm market-capitalization at the beginning of the year in which a recommendation is issued. 
IND_RET is the return to an industry index in the previous quarters (up to three quarters back). MKT_RET is the market return 
in the previous quarters (up to three quarters back). TOTAL_IPOSEO is the total IPO/SEO proceeds in the industry during the 
year preceding the recommendation. AVG_IPOSEO is the average IPO/SEO proceeds in the industry during the year preceding 
the recommendation. IPOSEO_PCT is the percentage of IPO/SEO proceeds in an industry underwritten by the issuing broker 
during the two years preceding the recommendation, out of all IPO/SEO proceeds underwritten by the same broker during that 
time period. Recession is a dummy variable and takes value of 1 if a recommendation is issued between 12/2007 and 6/2009. 
Cyclical is a dummy variable and takes value of 1 if a recommendation is issued to materials, industrials and IT industries. 
Marginal effects are reported at medians. In both specifications we control for broker fixed-effects. Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are calculated after clustering at the broker-industry level.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Prob(Ind Rec=Optimistic) Prob(Ind Rec=Pessimistic) 
  Coefficient Marginal Effects Coefficient Marginal Effects 
Industry_ Size -0.0206 -0.0051 -0.0921 -0.0078 
 (0.057)  (0.079)  
MB -0.0022** -0.0005 0.0018** 0.0002 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
Profit 0.9802* 0.2419 -2.2107*** -0.1867 
 (0.506)  (0.747)  
R&D 3.8978** 0.9621 -8.9194*** -0.7535 
 (1.637)  (2.135)  
Capex 0.9731*** 0.1386 -0.9139* -0.1151 
 (0.325)  (0.495)  
IND_RETt-1 1.3603*** 0.2402 -0.9928** -0.0772 
 (0.290)  (0.431)  
IND_RETt-2 0.6947*** 0.3357 -1.5756*** -0.0839 
 (0.253)  (0.400)  
IND_RETt-3 0.1838 0.1715 -0.6330* -0.1331 
 (0.277)  (0.352)  
MKT_RETt-1 0.3746 0.0454 -1.8627*** -0.0535 
 (0.246)  (0.389)  
MKT_RETt-2 -0.4463* 0.0925 -0.1666 -0.1573 
 (0.247)  (0.401)  
MKT_RETt-3 0.5615 -0.1102 -1.3627 -0.0141 
 (1.695)  (2.469)  
Recession -0.0046 -0.0011 -0.4836** -0.0289 
 (0.137)  (0.215)  
Cyclical 0.2635** 0.0656 -0.4020** -0.0336 
 (0.126)  (0.167)  
Cyclical*Recession -0.4223** -0.1004 0.3543 0.0345 
 (0.208)  (0.362)  
TOTAL_IPOSEO 0.1140** 0.0281 -0.0139 -0.0012 
 (0.057)  (0.077)  
AVG_IPOSEO -0.1758** -0.0434 0.0458 0.0038 
 (0.077)  (0.107)  
IPOSEO_PCT 0.6752 0.1667 -1.1361 -0.0960 
 (1.952)  (1.613)  
Observations 13,588  13,392   
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Table 3 – Summary Statistics on the Industry Recommendation Portfolios 
This table reports summary statistics on the industry recommendation portfolios during our sample period (9/2002-
12/2009). Our industry portfolios are constructed for each month based on consensus recommendations. A 
consensus recommendation is defined as the average industry recommendation within the month. In each month we 
refer to the consensus recommendation for an industry as “optimistic” if this consensus is less than or equal 1.5. We 
refer to the consensus recommendation as “pessimistic” if it is greater than or equal to 2.5. In all other cases, we 
refer to the consensus as “neutral.” We then construct three industry portfolios based on consensus changes for each 
month. Portfolio UI in month t consists of all industries that were upgraded to “optimistic” during month t-1, 
Portfolio DI consists of all industries that were downgraded to “pessimistic” during month t-1, and Portfolio NI 
consists of all industries that were either upgraded or downgraded into the “neutral” consensus during month t-1. 
Panel A describes basic characteristics about the portfolio formation: the number of months each portfolio is defined 
over; the average monthly consensus recommendation for all the industries that are part of the portfolio; the average 
number of industries included in each portfolio per month; the average number of firms (across all industries) in 
each portfolio; and the total number of different industries which ever enter into the portfolio. Panel B shows various 
portfolio returns. Industry return is defined as the value-weighted return across all CRSP firms in the relevant 
month. The monthly return for portfolios UI, NI, and DI is the equal weighted return of all industries in the relevant 
portfolio. “UI minus DI” is the self financing investment strategy of buying the industry recommendation portfolio 
UI and shorting the industry recommendation portfolio DI.  
 
Panel A – Portfolio Formation Characteristics 
 
Industry Recommendation 
Portfolio # of 
Months 
Ave. Monthly 
Consensus  
Rec. 
Ave. # of 
Industries 
per month 
Ave. # of 
Firms  
# of 
industries 
UI 87 1.29 5.51 667.55 65 
NI 87 1.92 10.42 1077.11 68 
DI 65 2.77 2.83 294.98 47 
 
Panel B – Industry Recommendation Portfolio Returns 
 
  
Raw Monthly Return 
 
Cumulative Returns 
 
Industry 
Recommendation 
Portfolio t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 
3 months    
(t, t+2) 
6 months     
(t,t+5) 
12 months   
(t,t+11) 
UI 0.0115 0.0133 0.0132 0.009 0.0036 0.0262  0.0578  0.0930  
p-value 0.0488 0.035 0.0182 0.116 0.5787 0.0339  0.0018  0.0007  
         
NI 0.0067 0.0068 0.0121 0.0095 0.0096 0.0313  0.0643  0.0916  
p-value 0.2477 0.2405 0.0243 0.1006 0.0785 0.0042  0.0005  0.0008  
         
DI 0.0058 -0.002 0.0009 0.01 0.0112 0.0237  0.0533  0.0604  
p-value 0.5108 0.8176 0.9223 0.1671 0.182 0.1765  0.0504  0.0830  
         
UI minus DI 0.0024 0.0130 0.0136 -0.002 -0.006 0.0065 0.0171 0.0442 
p-value 0.7063 0.0491 0.0175 0.6543 0.2757 0.4843 0.2078 0.0222 
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Table 4 - In-Sample/Out-of-Sample Alphas of Industry Recommendation Portfolios 
This table reports the in-sample alphas (Panel A) and the out-of-sample alphas (Panel B) of the industry 
recommendation portfolios during our sample period (9/2002-12/2009). The in-sample/out-of-sample tests are 
performed on each portfolio return in month t by using Fama-French four-factor model. Our industry portfolios are 
constructed for each month based on the consensus recommendations. A consensus recommendation is defined as 
the average industry recommendation within the month. In each month we refer to the consensus recommendation 
for an industry as “optimistic” if this consensus is less than or equal 1.5. We refer to the consensus recommendation 
as “pessimistic” if it is greater than or equal to 2.5. In all other cases, we refer to the consensus as “neutral.” We then 
construct three industry portfolios for each month. Portfolio UI in month t consists of all industries that were 
upgraded to “optimistic” during month t-1, Portfolio DI consists of all industries that were downgraded to 
“pessimistic” during month t-1, and Portfolio NI consists of all industries that were either upgraded or downgraded 
into the “neutral” consensus during month t-1. Once it enters a portfolio, an industry stays in it for “n” months or 
until it is upgraded or downgraded.  “n” is equal to 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, or 12 months.  Industry return is 
defined as the value-weighted return across all CRSP firms in the relevant month. The monthly return for portfolios 
UI, NI, and DI is the equal weighted return of all industries in the relevant portfolio. “UI minus DI” is the self 
financing investment strategy of buying the industry recommendation portfolio UI and shorting the industry 
recommendation portfolio DI.  
 
 
Panel A –In-Sample Alphas on Industry Recommendation Portfolios  
 
Industry Recommendation Portfolio 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
UI 0.0054 0.0032 0.0032 0.0035 
p-value 0.0204 0.0246 0.0183 0.0110 
     
NI 0.0041 0.0017 0.0018 0.0017 
p-value 0.0195 0.0679 0.0367 0.0432 
     
DI -0.0110 -0.0057 -0.0058 -0.0052 
p-value 0.0060 0.1003 0.0520 0.0837 
      
UI minus DI 0.0147 0.0069 0.0071 0.0068 
p-value 0.0032 0.0818 0.0397 0.0561 
 
Panel B – Out-of-Sample Alphas on Industry Recommendation Portfolios  
 
Industry Recommendation Portfolio 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
UI 0.0059 0.0017 0.0020 0.0023 
p-value 0.0088 0.3158 0.1492 0.0815 
     
NI 0.0014 0.0003 0.00037 0.0003 
p-value 0.4054 0.7811 0.7185 0.7901 
     
DI -0.0086 -0.0036 -0.0040 -0.0026 
p-value 0.0453 0.2893 0.1586 0.3856 
      
UI minus DI 0.0138 0.0031 0.0040 0.0028 
p-value 0.0030 0.4059 0.2048 0.3996 
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Table 5 - Distribution of Industry Recommendations and Firm Recommendations 
This table reports the distribution of firm recommendations within industry recommendation levels during our 
sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009).  Industry recommendations are coded as follows: “optimistic”=1, “neutral”=2, 
“pessimistic”=3. Firm recommendations are coded as follows: “strong buy” and “buy”=1, “hold”=2, 
“underperform” and “sell”=3.  
  
Industry Recommendation Firm Recommendation Frequencies % of total % of industry 
1 1 5456 13.33% 42.04% 
1 2 5844 14.28% 45.03% 
1 3 1678 4.10% 12.93% 
Ave. (1) 1.71   31.71% 100.00% 
     
2 1 7485 18.29% 33.54% 
2 2 11532 28.18% 51.68% 
2 3 3298 8.06% 14.78% 
Ave. (2) 1.81   54.53% 100.00% 
     
3 1 1487 3.63% 26.41% 
3 2 2879 7.04% 51.14% 
3 3 1264 3.09% 22.45% 
Ave. (3) 1.96    13.76% 100.00% 
p-values     
Ave (1) = Ave (2) <.0001    
Ave (2) = Ave (3) <.0001       
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Table 6 – Analysts’ disclosure about the meaning of firm recommendations 
This table reports information regarding the nature of firm recommendations, as it is disclosed by the brokerage 
houses. We include the 20 largest brokers in terms of the number of recommendations they issued during our sample 
period (9/2002-12/2009). In addition to the brokerage name and the percentage of recommendations, we indicate 
whether the recommendations are benchmarked to the industry. We also include an example of the original remark 
about the adopted benchmark by the brokerage house. These remarks are taken from brokerage disclosures included 
in their reports. 
 
# 
Brokerage 
House 
% of 
recs.  
Benchmark 
is Industry? Remarks about the benchmark 
1 
Argus 
Research 1.46% No 
“We will generally rate a stock a buy if, in our view, the forecast risk-
adjusted return on the stock is greater than the forecast return on the market.” 
2 
Banc of 
America 1.74% No 
“The rating system is based on a stock's forward -12-month expected total 
return (price appreciation plus dividend yield).”  
3 Bear Stearns 2.11% Yes 
"Stock's expected performance vs. analyst's industry coverage for the next 12 
months." 
4 CIBC 1.52% Yes “Stock's expected performance vs. the sector for the next 12-18 months.”  
5 CSFB 3.64% Yes “Stock's expected total return vs. the industry for the next 12 months.” 
6 Deutsche Bank 2.04% No 
“Buy: total return expected to appreciate 10% or more over a 12-month 
period.” 
7 
Friedman 
Billing 1.51% Yes 
Performance “relative to similar companies within its industry over the next 
12-18 months.” 
8 
Goldman 
Sachs 4.12% Yes 
“Our ratings reflect expected stock price performance relative to each 
analyst's coverage universe.” 
9 
Jefferies and 
Co. 1.55% No 
“Buy: describes stocks that we expect to provide a total return of 15% or 
more within a 12-month period.”  
10 JP Morgan 3.05% Yes 
“Overweight: Over the next six to twelve months, we expect this stock will 
outperform the average total return of the stocks in the analyst’s (or the 
analyst’s team’s) coverage universe.”  
11 
Lehman 
Brothers 2.16% Yes “Stock's performance vs. the industry for a 12 month investment horizon” 
12 Merrill Lynch 4.45% No “Based on stock's expected total return within a 12 month period.”  
13 
Morgan 
Stanley 2.77% Yes 
“Stock's total return vs. analyst's coverage on a risk-adjusted basis, for the 
next 12-18 months.” 
14 
Raymond 
James 1.76% No Performance “relative to the market index over the next 12 months.” 
15 RBC 1.39% Yes 
“The rating assigned to a particular stock represents solely the analyst's view 
of how that stock will perform over the next 12 months relative to the 
analyst's sector” 
16 Sidoti 1.37% No "Buy implies at least 25% upside over a 12-month period." 
17 Smith Barney 3.34% Yes 
“Stock's performance vs. the analyst's industry coverage for the coming 12-18 
months.” 
18 UBS 3.48% No 
“The UBS rating system begins with the analyst determining the forecast 
stock return over the next 12 months. The forecast stock return relative to a 
predefined hurdle rate determines the Recommendation (Buy, Neutral, or 
Sell). This hurdle rate is set on either side of an unbiased estimate of the 
market’s return over the next 12 months.” 
19 
US Bancorp 
Piper Jaffray 1.96% No Performance “relative to the market index over the next 12 months.” 
20 Wachovia 1.73% No Performance “relative to the market over the next 12 months.” 
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Table 7 – Pseudo-Industry Recommendations 
This table reports tests on the monthly pseudo-industry recommendations during our sample period (9/2002-
12/2009).  We use three different ways to define pseudo-industry recommendations.  All Brokers defines monthly 
pseudo-industry recommendations as the value-weighted firm recommendations issued by all brokers in IBES 
within a month and an industry.  Industry Benchmarkers defines monthly pseudo-industry recommendations as the 
value-weighted firm recommendations issued by 10 brokers out of 20 largest brokers in the IBES which use the 
sector benchmark for firm recommendations. Market Benchmarkers defines monthly pseudo-industry 
recommendations as the value-weighted firm recommendations issued by 10 brokers out of 20 largest brokers in the 
IBES which use the market benchmark for firm recommendations. Panel A presents summary statistics of each type 
of pseudo-industry recommendations.  Panel B presents the correlation among the three pseudo-industry 
recommendations and the true industry recommendation.  Panel C shows the in-sample/out-of-sample alphas of 
portfolios of upgraded industries (PUI), neutral industries (PNI) and downgraded industries (PDI) constructed based 
on pseudo industry recommendations.  The portfolios are constructed in a manner similar to the portfolios UI, NI 
and DI in Table 3, except that now the industry outlook is expressed by pseudo industry recommendations rather 
than the true industry recommendations. 
Panel A – Summary Statistics 
 Pseudo-industry recommendation 
  N Average  STD 
All brokers  5598 1.6227 0.3316 
10 industry benchmarkers  4999 1.7143 0.4392 
10 industry market benchmarkers 5040 1.6180 0.4475 
Real-industry recommendation 4476 1.8541 0.4941 
 
Panel B – Correlation Matrix 
  
Pseudo Ind. 
Rec. (All 
brokers) 
Pseudo Ind. 
Rec. (Industry 
Benchmarkers) 
Pseudo Ind. 
Rec. (Market 
Benchmarkers) 
Real-industry 
Recs 
Pseudo Ind. Rec. (All brokers) 1    
Pseudo Ind. Rec.  
(Industry Benchmarkers) 0.5207 1   
Pseudo Ind. Rec.  
(Market Benchmarkers) 0.4887 0.1191 1  
Real Industry Recs 0.1582 0.1432 0.1054 1 
 
Panel C –In-Sample/ Out-of-Sample Alphas 
    In-Sample Alphas   Out-of-Sample Alphas 
Portfolio All Brokers 
Industry 
Benchmarkers 
Market 
Benchmarkers All Brokers 
Industry 
Benchmarkers 
Market 
Benchmarkers 
PUI 0.0031 0.0024 0.0042 0.0026 0.0013 0.0036 
p-value 0.1088 0.2368 0.0109 0.1470 0.5689 0.0166 
PNI -0.0007 0.0008 -0.0010 0.0006 0.0012 -0.0024 
p-value 0.7372 0.6065 0.4760 0.7365 0.4615 0.1525 
PDI 0.0076 0.0018 -0.0129 0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0019 
p-value 0.1763 0.7299 0.0522 0.9785 0.6775 0.7903 
PUI minus PDI -0.0046 -0.0011 0.0167 -0.0046 0.0025 0.0013 
p-value   0.5079 0.8671 0.0138 0.7107 0.8178 0.5032 
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Table 8 – In-Sample/Out-of-Sample Alphas of Portfolios Sorted by Firm and Industry Recommendations 
This table presents the performance of portfolios sorted by both firm recommendations and industry consensus recommendations during our sample period 
(9/2002-12/2009). For each month t, firms are first sorted based on the consensus industry recommendation, and then are sorted based on firm recommendations 
(upgrades and downgrades). Industry recommendation portfolios are constructed as follows: for each month the consensus industry recommendation is defined as 
the average industry recommendation within the month. In each month we refer to the consensus recommendation for an industry as “optimistic” if this 
consensus is less than or equal 1.5. We refer to the consensus recommendation as “pessimistic” if it is greater than or equal to 2.5. In all other cases, we refer to 
the consensus as “neutral.” We then construct three industry portfolios for each month. Portfolio UI in month t consists of all industries that were upgraded to 
“optimistic” during month t-1, Portfolio DI consists of all industries that were downgraded to “pessimistic” during month t-1, and Portfolio NI consists of all 
industries that were either upgraded or downgraded into the “neutral” consensus during month t-1. Firm recommendation portfolios are constructed as follows: 
For each stock, we count the number of upgrades and number of downgrades that the stock received in month t-1. Portfolio UF includes stocks with a larger 
number of upgrades than downgrades, while portfolio DF includes stocks with more downgrades.  Once it enters a portfolio, a firm will stay in the portfolio for 
“n” months or until its firm recommendation/industry recommendation is changed.  “n” is equal to 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, or 12 months.   (UI,UF) refers 
to the portfolio of firms which belong to both industry recommendation portfolio UI and firm recommendation portfolio UF. (DI,DF) refers to the portfolio of 
firms which belongs to both industry recommendation portfolio DI and firm recommendation portfolio DF. “(UI,UF) minus (DI,DF)” refers to the investment 
strategy of buying portfolio (UI,UF) and shorting portfolio (DI,DF). Out-of-sample tests are performed on the portfolio return in month t by using Fama-French 
four-factor model.  
 
Panel A – In-Sample Alphas 
    1 month   3 months   6 months   12 months 
Firm 
Recommendation 
Portfolios 
Firm 
Recommendation 
Portfolios 
Firm 
Recommendation 
Portfolios 
Firm 
Recommendation 
Portfolios 
Industry Recommendation 
Portfolios UF DF UF DF UF DF UF DF 
UI 0.0128 0.0101 0.0065 0.0080 0.0049 0.0069 0.0058 0.0067 
p-value 0.0048 0.0371 0.0247 0.0173 0.0855 0.0400 0.0390 0.0470 
NI 0.0090 0.0018 0.0073 -0.0008 0.0067 -0.0002 0.0060 -0.0002 
p-value 0.0014 0.4823 0.0000 0.6012 0.0000 0.8739 0.0001 0.9133 
DI -0.0078 -0.0232 -0.0081 -0.0129 -0.0112 -0.0188 -0.0102 -0.0184 
p-value 0.2332 0.0030 0.0653 0.0270 0.0029 0.0003 0.0052 0.0001 
UI minus DI 0.0208 0.0269 0.0130 0.0155 0.0147 0.0204 0.0146 0.0197 
p-value 0.0216 0.0070 0.0378 0.0132 0.0068 0.0005 0.0050 0.0004 
(UI,UF) minus (DI,DF) 0.0373 0.0177 0.0222 0.0227 
p-value   0.0003 0.0173 0.0007 0.0002 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Panel B – Out-of-Sample Alphas 
    1 month   3 months   6 months   12 months 
Firm 
Recommendation 
Portfolios 
Firm 
Recommendation 
Portfolios 
Firm 
Recommendation 
Portfolios 
Firm 
Recommendation 
Portfolios 
Industry Recommendation 
Portfolios UF DF UF DF UF DF UF DF 
UI 0.0144 0.0150 0.0057 0.0096 0.0039 0.0084 0.0049 0.0079 
p-value 0.0006 0.0053 0.0350 0.0111 0.1310 0.0243 0.0485 0.0330 
NI 0.0050 -0.0006 0.0040 -0.0021 0.0036 -0.0011 0.0030 -0.0015 
p-value 0.0622 0.8342 0.0252 0.2894 0.0210 0.5355 0.0477 0.4197 
DI -0.0065 -0.0169 -0.0046 -0.0119 -0.0074 -0.0157 -0.0067 -0.0137 
p-value 0.3330 0.0246 0.2840 0.0873 0.0463 0.0037 0.0566 0.0046 
UI minus DI 0.0233 0.0284 0.0083 0.0160 0.0095 0.0189 0.0097 0.0163 
p-value 0.0113 0.0061 0.1393 0.0225 0.0499 0.0014 0.0033 0.0020 
(UI,UF) minus (DI,DF) 0.0330 0.0161 0.0183 0.0171 
p-value   0.0007     0.0393     0.0031     0.0020   
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Table 9 – Robustness for Momentum  
This table reports the robustness of the investment value of industry recommendation portfolios after controlling for 
industry momentum.  For each month t during our sample period (9/2002-12/2009), we construct three momentum 
portfolios based on the cumulative industry returns in the previous six months. Momentum portfolio MOM1 
contains the top 15% of industries with the highest past returns, and momentum portfolio MOM3 contains the 
bottom 15% of industries with the lowest past returns. Industry return is defined as the value-weighted return across 
all CRSP firms in the relevant industry in month t.  Panel A reports the overlap between industry momentum 
portfolios and industry recommendation portfolios.  Panel B reports the out-of-sample alphas of momentum 
portfolios.  The monthly return for the momentum portfolios is the equal weighted return of all industries in the 
relevant portfolio. “MOM1 minus MOM3” is the self financing investment strategy of buying the industry 
momentum portfolio MOM1 and shorting the industry momentum portfolio MOM3. “UI minus DI” is the self 
financing investment strategy of buying the industry recommendation portfolio UI and shorting the industry 
recommendation portfolio DI. The in-sample/out-of-sample tests are performed on the portfolio return in month t by 
using Fama-French four-factor model.  Panel C reports the in-sample/out-of-sample alphas of industry 
recommendation portfolios net of momentum portfolios.  More specifically, industries which belong to momentum 
portfolio MOM1 (MOM3) are excluded from industry recommendation portfolio UI (DI).  Panel D reports the 
results of analyzing the performance of industry recommendation portfolios by using Fama-Macbeth regressions. 
The dependent variable is the industry recommendation portfolio return in month t. Details on the construction of 
industry recommendation portfolios are discussed in table 3.  The independent variables are as follows: Port takes 
value of 1 (2 or 3) if an industry belongs to industry recommendation portfolio UI (NI or DI) in month t, Ind_Rec is 
the consensus industry recommendation (i.e. the average of all industry recommendations) in month t-1, Firm Size 
is the value-weighted average firm size in an industry in month t-1, MB is value weighted market-to-book ratio in an 
industry in previous year, Market_Beta is the an industry’s market beta estimated using previous 60-month return 
data,  and Past_Ind_Ret is  the cumulative industry return from month t-6 to month t-1. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A - The overlap between industry momentum portfolios and industry recommendation portfolios 
 
Industry recommendation 
Portfolio Momentum Portfolio No. of Industries  % of total (conditional) 
UI MOM1  87 17.94% 
UI MOM2 340 70.10% 
UI MOM3 58 11.96% 
485 100.00% 
NI MOM1 119 12.98% 
NI MOM2 652 71.10% 
NI MOM3 146 15.92% 
917 100.00% 
DI MOM1 19 10.33% 
DI MOM2 127 69.02% 
DI MOM3 38 20.65% 
    184 100.00% 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B –Four Factor Alphas on Momentum Portfolios 
 
Momentum Portfolio  In-Sample Alpha Out-of-Sample Alpha 
MOM1  0.0027 -0.0027 
p-value  0.2582 0.3056 
      
MOM2  0.0004 0.1132 
p-value  0.6385 0.9101 
      
MOM3  0.0003 0.0044 
p-value  0.9106 0.1337 
      
MOM1 minus MOM3  0.0005 -0.0090 
p-value  0.9132 0.0511 
p-value - Out-of-Sample Alpha                                      
(MOM1 minus MOM3) vs. (UI minus DI): 0.0005 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C- Alphas for Industry Recommendations Net of Momentum Portfolios 
 
Industry Recommendation Portfolio  
(One Month)  In-Sample Alpha Out-of-Sample Alpha 
UI  0.0054 0.0098 
p-value  0.0159 0.0004 
      
NI  0.0041 0.0014 
p-value  0.0195 0.4054 
      
DI  -0.0079 -0.0053 
p-value  0.0530 0.2036 
     
UI minus DI  0.0122 0.0145 
p-value  0.0071 0.0031 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel D – Cross-Sectional Analysis of Industry Recommendation Portfolios  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Port -0.0045** -0.0069*** 
(0.0023) (0.0023) 
Ind_Rec -0.0058* -0.0068** 
(0.0031) (0.0033) 
Log(Firm Size) -0.0018 -0.0011 
(0.0016) (0.0017) 
Log(1+MB) 0.0053 0.0068 
(0.0085) (0.0081) 
Market_Beta 0.0028 0.0028 
(0.0048) (0.0048) 
Past_Ind_Ret 0.0083 0.0124 
(0.025) (0.0242) 
Constant 0.0177*** 0.0251 0.0202*** 0.0177 
(0.0056) (0.0175) (0.0066) (0.0185) 
Observations 1,548 1,548 1,548 1,548 
R-squared 0.066 0.505 0.083 0.512 
Number of groups 87 87 87 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
